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New Publication from Kiseido

Mastering the Basics, Volume Four

501 Tesuji Problems

Compiled and written by Richard Bozulich

Tesujis are skillful moves that accomplish some clear tactical objective, such as capturing stones or a group, rescuing one of your own groups linking up your stones, separating your opponent's stones, making good shape, etc.

There are two approaches to presenting tesujis problems. One approach is to collect problems according to the objective that tesujis accomplish. The other is to collect problems according to the kind of tesuji used. In this book the emphasis is on the latter.

There are about 45 different kinds of moves that make up tesujis. Each of these moves has a Japanese term that describes them. Some of these tesujis occur quite frequently in games, while others are seldom seen. In this book, I have attempted to present examples of every kind of tesuji. The more common ones occur in numerous problems, but even the less common ones will be represented a number of times. Every tesuji presented in this book can be found among the first 50 problems.

All of these different tesujis are scattered throughout the book. Just as in a game, one never knows what kind of tesuji will appear. It may be easy to find it, but often it is hard; it might be a quite common tesuji, but it could be one of those that rarely occur. Going through the 501 tesujis in this book will be like getting a tesuji experience in 501 games. In a game, however, many tesujis will go by unnoticed; in this book, each problem will be a learning experience.

Many of the problems are easy, but many are hard. I recommend that you make an effort to solve each problem before looking at the answer, but don't spend too much time on them. The important thing is to expose yourself to the tesuji. As you work your way through this book, you will find that the tesujis that solve the problems will appear to you more and more quickly. Once you have reached this level, the same thing will start happening in your games.

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Also available in the Mastering the Basic series:

K71: *501 Opening Problems*

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The cover: The center and the left panels of an oban triptych by Toyokuni III published in 1855 titled *Hana Kurabe Gokaku no Torikumi*. This triptych shows two popular kabuki actors, Bando Takesaburo (unseen) and Nakamura Fukusuke (left). They were rivals and also evenly matched go players. The actor Iwai Kumesaburo III stands over the go board. From the collection of Kiseido.

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Go World News

Late January~late April 2006

by John Power

International

China wins 4th Cheongkwangjang Cup

China won this women's team tournament comfortably, without having to field its last player. To review the course of the tournament, the first player to star was the 16-year-old Wang Xiangyun of China, who won five games in a row, including all four games in the opening round. This was quite a dramatic start to an international career (actually it was pretty close to being the start of her professional career). Chinen Kaori then made a recovery for Japan, winning three games.

In the final round, Pak Chi-eun of Korea raised Korea's hopes by stopping Rui Naiwei before she could wrap up the tournament for China, but Ye Gui, the number four on the Chinese team, edged Pak by half a point in the next game. That meant that Xu Ying of China did not play a game.

This completed a great start to the year for China, as it was its third international triumph in two weeks (following the Agon Kiriya Cup play-off and the 10th Samsung Cup, both reported in our previous issue).

First prize is 100 million won.

The last two games are presented in this issue.

The Shanghai Round

Game 11 (16 Jan.). Pak Chi-eun 6-dan (Korea) (B) defeated Rui Naiwei 9-dan (China) by 1½ points.

Game 12 (17 Jan.). Pak (B) d. Koyama Terumi 5-dan (Japan) by 4½ points.

Game 13 (18 Jan.). Ye Gui 5-dan (China) (B) d. Pak by ½ point.


Japan breaks Korean monopoly in Nong Shim Cup

Japan has finally broken a Korean monopoly in team tournaments that extended through five Jinro and six Nong Shim cups. In the 7th Nong Shim Spicy Noodles Cup, Japan started the final round at a disadvantage, with only one player left to two each for Korea and China. However, the last Japanese player, Yoda Norimoto 9-dan, rose to the occasion magnificently, winning three

games in a row, including a win over Yi Ch'ang-ho, to clinch victory. This was Yi's first-ever loss in the Nong Shim Cup after a winning streak of 14 games (his full record is given in 'The Iron Goalkeeper' in GW105). Yoda now leads Yi 9-8 in personal encounters (their record is given in GW102, page 36).

Yoda earned a ten-million-won bonus for winning three games in a row. The team prize is 150 million won.*

Incidentally, the final game against Yi was the first in which the Japanese team drew black after nine games with white.



Yoda looks satisfied with a good three days' work.

The Shanghai Round

Game 11 (21 Feb.). Cho Han-seung 8-dan (Korea) (B) d. Chang Hao 9-dan (China) by resig.

Game 12 (22 Feb.). Yoda Norimoto 9-dan (Japan) (W) d. Cho by resig.

Game 13 (23 Feb.). Yoda (W) d. Kong Jie 7-dan by resig.

Game 14 (24 Feb.). Yoda (B) d. Yi Ch'ang-ho 9-dan (Korea) by resig.

* Exchange rates: \$1 = ¥117 = 970 won = 8 yuan = 32.4 Taiwanese dollars.

Team scores

Japan: 6-4; Korea: 5-5; China: 3-5.

Gu Li wins 10th LG Cup

Two Chinese players fought it out in the 10th LG Cup final. The senior one, Gu Li 7-dan, who has been China's number one for a couple of years though he is still only 23, made a good start by winning the first two games, but then his 16-year old opponent, Chen Yaoye 5-dan, fought back strongly to take the next two games. However, Gu triumphed in the final game and so won his first international title.

We don't mean to slight Gu, but in one way it's a pity Chen didn't prevail, as the concomitant automatic promotion to 9-dan would have made him the youngest 9-dan ever.

Game 1 (6 March). Gu (W) by resig.

Game 2 (8 March). Gu (B) by resig.

Game 3 (17 April). Chen (B) by 2½.

Game 4 (19 April). Chen (W) by resig.

Game 5 (21 April). Gu (B) by resig.

6th Chunlan Cup a triumph for home players

Once again the Chinese have secured six of the quarterfinal places in an international tournament, so their good form this year continues. They are joined by two Korean players, including the formidable Yi Se-tol, however, so a Chinese victory is by no means a foregone conclusion. Japan started well, with all its first-round players winning their games, but ran out of steam in the second round.

Round One (11 March, Beijing)

Yoda Norimoto 9-dan (Japan) (W) d. Kong Jie 7-dan (China) by resig.; Cho Chikun 9-dan (Japan) (W) d. Yu Bin 9-dan (China) by 2½; Yuki Satoshi 9-dan (Japan) (W) d. Zhou Junxun 9-dan (Taiwan) by resig.; Kono Rin 8-dan (Japan) (B) d. Lin Shengxian 7-dan (Taiwan) by 9½; Ko Keun-t'ae 4-dan (Korea) (W) d. Michael Redmond 9-dan (U.S.) by 2½; Yi Se-tol 9-dan (Korea) (W) d. Catalin Taranu 5-dan (Europe) by resig.; Xie He 6-dan (China) (B) d. Ch'oe Ch'eol-han 9-dan (Korea) by resig.; Chen Yaoye 5-dan (China) (B) d. Pak Yeong-hun 9-dan (Korea) by 1½.

Round Two (13 March, Beijing)

Xie (B) d. Hane Naoki 9-dan (Japan) by 1½; Zhou Heyang 9-dan (China) (B) d. Cho Chikun by resig.; Yi Se-tol (W) d. Luo Xihe 9-dan (China) by resig.; Hu Yaoyu 8-dan (China) (W) d. Yoda by resig.; Yi Ch'ang-ho 9-dan (Korea) (B) d. Chen by resig.; Chang Hao 9-dan (China) (W) d. Yuki by resig.; Peng Quan 6-dan (China) (B) d. Ko by 3½; Gu Li 7-dan (China) (W) d. Kono by resig.

China wins China-Korea team match

The Kangwon Land Cup is a knockout tournament between six-player teams from China and Korea. The latter started well, but Chang Hao secured victory for his team with a four-game winning streak that culminated in a win against Yi Ch'ang-ho. This was Yi's second failure in a team tournament this year. The sixth player on the Chinese team, Gu Li, did not have to play.

First prize is \$150,000.

Opening rounds of 18th Fujitsu Cup

The opening rounds of the 18th Fujitsu Cup were held at the Nihon Ki-in in Ichigaya, Tokyo on 8 and 10 April. The result was yet another resounding success for Korea, which won five of the quarterfinal places; two went to China and just one to the host country.

At the opening ceremony, Yi Se-tol of Korea caused a bit of a stir when he said that personally he hoped to see two Japanese players make the final this time; he can afford to be so magnanimous, as he has won this tournament three times. However, he eliminated one of the Japanese representatives when, as a seeded player, he made his debut in the second round, so he is playing his part in preventing his wish from coming true. If a Korean does win, it will be the ninth year in a row.

The quarterfinals will be played in Beijing on 3 June.

Round 1 (Nihon Ki-in, 8 April)

Yamashita Keigo 9-dan (Japan) (W) d. Cho Han-seung 8-dan (Korea) by resig.; Yuki Satoshi 9-dan (Japan) (W) d. Yu Bin 9-dan (China) by resig.; Cho U 9-dan (Japan) (W) d. Eduardo Lopez am. 6-dan (South America) by resig.; Cho Chikun 9-dan (Japan) (W) d. Alexandre Dinerchtein 1-dan (Europe) by 14½; Zhou Junxun 9-dan (Chinese Taipei) (B) d. Takao Shinji 9-dan (Japan) by resig.; Pak Yeong-hun 9-dan (Korea) (B) d. Yamashiro Hiroshi 9-dan (Japan) by resig.; Pak Cheong-sang 5-dan (Korea) (W) d. Jiang Mingjiu 7-dan (North America) by 9½; Zhou Heyang 9-dan (China) (W) d. Ko Keun-t'ae 4-dan (Korea) by resig.

Round 2 (Nihon Ki-in, 10 April)

Yi Se-tol 9-dan (Korea) (B) d. Cho Chikun by resig.; Yi Ch'ang-ho 9-dan (Korea) (W) d. Yamashita Keigo by 2½; Zhou Heyang (W) d. Yu Ch'ang-hyeok 9-dan (Korea) by 1½; Ch'oe Ch'eol-han 9-dan (Korea) (B) d. Cho U by 1½; Chang Hao 9-dan (China) (W) d. Zhou Junxun by resig.; Pak Yeong-hun (W) d. Luo Xihe 9-dan (China) by resig.; Yuki (B) d. Gu Li 7-dan (China) by resig.; Pak Cheong-sang (B) d. Hane Naoki 9-dan (Japan) by 2½.

Current international champions

5th Ing Cup: Chang Hao (China)
 2nd Toyota & Denso Cup: Yi Se-tol (Korea)
 18th Fujitsu Cup: Yi Se-tol
 10th Samsung Cup: Luo Xihe (China)
 5th Chunlan Cup: Yi Ch'ang-ho (Korea)
 10th LG Cup: Gu Li (China)
 17th TV Asia Cup: Cho U
 2nd Zhonghuan Cup: Ch'oe Ch'eol-han (Korea)
 7th Nong Shim Spicy Noodles Cup: Japan
 4th CSK Cup: Korea
 4th Cheongkwanjang Cup: China

Most world championships won

20: Yi Ch'ang-ho (+ 2 invitationals)
 11: Cho Hun-hyeon
 6: Takemiya Masaki, Yu Ch'ang-hyeok, Yi Se-tol
 4: Yoda Norimoto
 3: Yu Bin
 2: Otake Hideo, Ma Xiaochun, O Rissei, Cho Chikun, Pak Yeong-hun, Cho U
 1: Kobayashi Koichi, Rin Kaiho, Seo Pong-su, Zhou Heyang, Chang Hao, Ch'oe Ch'eol-han, Luo Xihe, Gu Li

(By country) Korea: 47; Japan: 20;
 China: 9

Team championships (Jinro, Nong Shim, Igo Asia/CSK)

Korea: 13 Japan: 2 China: 1

News from Japan

Top title winners (10+)

69: Cho Chikun	18: Takagawa Shukaku
64: Sakata Eio	15: Shimamura Toshihiro
59: Kobayashi Koichi	14: Yamashiro Hiroshi
48: Otake Hideo	12: Hashimoto Utaro,
47: Kato Masao	Cho U, Hane Naoki
35: Rin Kaiho, Yoda	10: Sugiuchi Kazuko,
Norimoto	Kobayashi Reiko,
24: Ishida Yoshio,	Kobayashi Izumi,
Takemiya Masaki	Aoki Kikuyo,
23: Fujisawa Shuko	Yamashita Keigo
22: O Rissei	

Also: Takao Shinji: 7

Yamashita makes comeback as Kisei

After a two-year absence, Yamashita Keigo has made a comeback as the top titleholder. He had ended the previous year badly, with succes-

sive title-match defeats, but he more than redeemed himself by defeating Hane Naoki 4-0 in the 30th Kisei title match.



On top again — Yamashita the morning after he regained the Kisei title.

Yamashita has always done well against Hane (see box on page 48), but the title match was not as one-sided as it might appear. Actually, in each game in the match the player with white played well, but Hane was unable to convert good positions into wins in Games 1 and 3. In the end, that proved costly, as Yamashita played brilliantly in the two games in which he had white.

The first two games are presented in this issue.

Game 1 (15, 16 Jan). Yamashita (B) by resig.

Game 2 (1, 2 Feb.). Yamashita (W) by 6½.

Game 3 (8, 9 Feb.). Yamashita (B) by 1½.

Game 4 (22, 23 Feb.). Yamashita (W) by 2½.

31st Kisei Leagues

The four vacant places have all been decided. Cho U Meijin, Imamura Toshiya 9-dan, and Honda Kuniyoshi 9-dan have won their way back in immediately after dropping out, and Cho Chikun Judan reappears after a one-year absence.

Cho Chikun defends Judan title

Cho Chikun has increased his tally of titles to 69 by defeating Yamashita Keigo Kisei 3-1 in the 44th Judan title match. This success justifies

once again Cho's reputation for being at his strongest in title matches. Before the match started, he was not considered the favourite, as he had a dismal career record against Yamashita of just three wins to nine losses. On top of that, Yamashita had the momentum of his Kisei triumph.



Still at the top after 30 years

Cho quickly showed that past results are irrelevant in a title match, as he swept to a 2-0 lead. Yamashita made a brief comeback with a good win in the third game, but then Cho wrapped it up in the fourth.

Cho has ended his 40s on a good note: on 20 June he will become the only titleholder in his 50s (there is one in his 40s, Yoda Norimoto Gosei; the others are in their 20s).

This was Yamashita's fourth successive title match, following last year's Oza and Tengen and this year's Kisei matches. He must be a little disappointed at winning only one of them, though that was the big one.

Play-off between Winners' and Losers' sections (26 Jan.). Yamashita (B) beat Takao Shinji Honinbo by resig.

Game 1 (8 March). Cho (W) by resig.
Game 2 (27 March). Cho (B) by resig.
Game 3 (5 April). Yamashita (B) by 8½.
Game 4 (13 April). Cho (B) by 2½.

Cho Sonjin wins NEC Cup

In the final of the 25th NEC Cup, held on 4 March, Cho Sonjin 9-dan (B) beat Kobayashi

Satoru 9-dan by 5½ points to win this title for the first time.

The first prize is quite substantial: 15,000,000 yen, which ranks it fifth in Japan. Second prize is 7,500,000 yen.

Prize money for Japanese titles

1. Kisei: ¥42,000,000
2. Meijin: ¥36,000,000
3. Honinbo: ¥32,000,000
4. Toyota & Denso Cup: ¥30,000,000
5. Fujitsu Cup, NEC Cup: ¥15,000,000
7. Judan: ¥14,000,000
8. Tengen, Oza: ¥13,500,000
10. Gosei: ¥7,770,000

Hane wins NHK Cup

Hane Naoki hasn't gone into a slump after losing the Kisei title. In fact, soon after this setback he won the final of the 53rd NHK Cup, which was telecast on 19 March. Although the prize money is only ¥5,000,000, this is one of the most closely followed tournaments in Japan, as it is telecast at lunchtime on Sunday. Players sometimes comment that a win in it is like three wins in another tournament, because of the amount of attention it attracts.

There were two unusual points about the tournament this year. None of the quarterfinalists had won the cup before, which was a little unusual, and none of the semifinalists was from the Tokyo headquarters of the Nihon Ki-in, which was a first. One semifinal matched the Kansai Ki-in players Imamura Toshiya 9-dan and Mori-yama Naoki 9-dan against each other, while two Nagoya players, Imamura Yoshiaki 8-dan and Hane Naoki 9-dan, met in the other. In the first-ever Nagoya-Osaka final, telecast on 19 March, Hane, playing black, defeated Imamura Toshiya by resignation. This gave the Nagoya branch of the Nihon Ki-in its first NHK Cup victory since Shimamura Toshihiro 9-dan won the inaugural tournament.

Yamada Kimio Honinbo challenger

The 61st Honinbo League ended in a three-way tie, with Hane Naoki Kisei, Yoda Norimoto Gosei, and Yamada Kimio 9-dan all scoring 5-2. Going into the final round, Hane had the sole lead, but he lost to Yamada Kimio by half a point, while Yoda beat O Meien. Usually, only the two higher-ranked players qualify for a play-off, but both Yamada and Hane were newcomers to the league and so had the same rank. This was


61st Honinbo league (6 October 2005 to 29 March 2006)

Title-holder: Takao Shinji

Rank	Player/opponent	CU	CS	YN	OM	HN	OR	YK	SY	Score
4	Cho U	—	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	4-3
—	Cho Sonjin	0	—	0	1	0	1	1	0	3-4
1	Yoda Norimoto	1	1	—	1	0	1	1	0	5-2
—	O Meien	0	0	0	—	0	0	0	0	0-7
1	Hane Naoki	0	1	1	1	—	1	0	1	5-2
—	O Rissei	0	0	0	1	0	—	0	1	2-5
1	Yamada Kimio	1	0	0	1	1	1	—	1	5-2
—	So Yokoku	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	—	4-3

the first three-way play-off for 30 years (the adoption of the above rule is one reason, of course, why they've become more unusual).

In the first play-off (3 April), Yamada defeated Hane a second time, then once again came out on the right side of a half-pointer in the final play-off against Yoda on 13 April.



Yamada will be making his first challenge for a top-three title. To date, his main successes have been winning the 45th Oza title in 1997 and taking second place in the 5th Samsung Cup in 2000. He now has a chance to claim a place among the elite of the Japanese go world.

The first game of the title match with Takao Shinji will be played on 8 and 9 May.

Play-off 1

(3 April) Yamada (B) defeated Hane by resig.

Play-off 2

(13 April) Yamada (B) defeated Yoda by half a point.

12th Ricoh Cup

The team of Suzuki Ayumi 3-dan and Cho U Meijin won the 12th Ricoh Cup, a pair-go tour-

nament for professionals. In the final, held on 4 February, they defeated Kobayashi Izumi 6-dan (Cho's wife) and Yamashita Keigo 9-dan. Suzuki/Cho had white and secured a resignation.



The winning team of Suzuki and Cho

First prize is 5 million yen, of which one million is donated to buy go sets for schools.

Kobayashi Satoru leads 31st Meijin League

Halfway through the league, Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan seems to have a good chance of making a repeat challenge, as he has the sole lead on 3-1. However, he has played one game fewer than his nearest rivals, Yoda Norimoto Gosei and Takao Shinji Honinbo, who are both on 3-2. Actually, every member of the league is still in the running.

31st Meijin league (8 December 2005 to August 2006)

Title-holder: Cho U

Rank	Player/opponent	KS	YK	IT	YK	SH	YN	TS	HZ	KI	Score
1	Kobayashi Satoru	—	1	0			1		1		3-1
2	Yamashita Keigo	0	—		1			0	0		1-3
3	Imamura Toshiya	1		—	0		0	1		0	2-3
4	Yamada Kimio		0	1	—		0	0		1	2-3
5	Sakai Hideyuki					—	1	0	1	0	2-2
6	Yoda Norimoto	0		1	1	0	—	1			3-2
7	Takao Shinji		1	0	1	1	0	—			3-2
7	Han Zenki	0	1			0			—	1	2-2
7	Ko Iso			1	0	1			0	—	2-2

*Aoki sets a record for the Women's Meijin***Aoki makes comeback as Women's Meijin**

Three players have dominated the Women's Meijin title, each winning it four times. They are Sugiuchi Kazuko 8-dan, Aoki Kikuyo 8-dan, and Koyama Terumi 5-dan (whose first three titles were won under her maiden name of Nishida Terumi). Aoki has now moved one step ahead of her rivals by winning the title for a fifth time. In the best-of-three match for the 18th title, she defeated Koyama 2-0 to take the ¥5,100,000 first prize. This was Aoki's 10th title, which earns her a place in our honour roll (on page 4) of Japanese title winners.

Game 1 (9 Feb.). Aoki (B) by ½.

Game 2 (15 Feb.). Aoki (W) by 1½.

Mannami wins Women's Kisei title

Mannami Kana 3-dan defeated the titleholder Chinen Kaori 4-dan 2-1 in the 9th Women's

Kisei title match and so regained the title that Chinen took from her two years ago. The first prize is ¥3,500,000.

Mannami's younger sister Nao (age 20) made her debut as a professional in April, so things are going well for the Mannami family. Nao's goal is to catch up with her sister, who became a professional at 16.

Game 1 (telecast on 28 Jan.). Mannami (W) by resig.

Game 2 (1 Feb.). Chinen (W) by resig.

Game 3 (telecast on 22 Feb.). Mannami (W) by 2½.

*Mannami Kana***Promotions****Annual promotions**

According to the new promotion system, the top prize-money-winners from 1-dan to 6-dan earn promotions. The promotions based on 2005 results were announced recently; the actual promotions took effect on 1 April.

To 7-dan: Takano Hideki (only one 6-dan is promoted by this system)

To 6-dan: Mochizuki Kenichi, Kuwamoto Shinpei

To 5-dan: Ms. Kato Keiko, Ko Reibun

To 4-dan: Oba Junya, Mitani Tetsuya

To 3-dan: Anzai Nobuaki, Ms. Xie Yimin
To 2-dan: Ri Ishu, Ando Kazushige.

In addition, two players earned promotions by the cumulative-wins system in February. Kubo Hideo went to 6-dan with 90 wins and Ms. Nakamura Kuniko to 2-dan with 30 wins. In April, Tsujii Ryotaro made it to 7-dan with 120 wins.

Retirements

Hiroe Katsuhiko 7-dan (as of 31 January)
Shimohira Akio 7-dan (as of 31 March)
Oka Nobumitsu 6-dan (as of 31 March)

Daughter born to Kobayashi Izumi

Kobayashi Izumi 6-dan had her first child, a girl who was named Kosumi, towards the end of March. Despite the similarity, the name is not the go term for diagonal move; it is written with characters meaning 'clear heart'. With Izumi for a mother, Cho U Meijin for a father, Kobayashi Koichi and Kobayashi Reiko as grandfather and grandmother, and Kitani Minoru as great-grandfather, is there any way Kosumi won't be a go player?

Two milestones

In late March, Takemiya Masaki scored his 1,000th win after a professional career lasting 40 years ten months. He is the eighth player to reach this mark in Japan.

On 19 January, Takao Shinji Honinbo set two records when he scored his 600th win as a professional: he was the youngest player, at 29 years two months, to reach this mark and he did it in the shortest time, 14 years nine months. He also had the best winning record, 75.4%, at this point.



Hisajima Kunio (1946–2006)

Obituary: Hisajima Kunio

Hisajima Kunio died of bleeding from a duodenal ulcer on 5 April. Born on 5 June 1946, Hisajima became a disciple of Kitani Minoru in 1957; he qualified as 1-dan in 1965 and reached 9-dan in 1991. His main achievements were winning the 8-dan section of the Kisei tournament in 1990 and reaching the play-off to decide the 20th Gosei challenger in 1995.

Ishida Yoshio, who became a Kitani disciple in the same year, said it was a shock to have the third fellow Kitani disciple, following Kamimura Kunio and Kato Masao, die in his 50s.

News from Korea

Rui defends Women's Myeongin title

Rui's two strongest rivals in the Korean go world are Pak Chi-eun and Cho Hye-yeon, both of whom have won the Women's Myeongin (= Meijin) title once. The latter was the challenger for the 7th Myeongin title, but the best she could do was to take one game off the defending champion. Rui has now won this title for five out of seven terms.

The winner's purse is eight million won and the loser's three million.

Game 1 (7 Jan.). Rui (W) by 2½.
Game 2 (11 Jan.). Cho (W) by resig.
Game 3 (27 Jan.). Rui (B) by resig.



Yet another title for Yi

Yi wins 1st 10-dan title

This is a new title founded in 2005. In the

first title match, Yi Ch'ang-ho 9-dan defeated Pak Yeong-hun 9-dan 2-1. First prize is 25 million won and second is ten million.

Game 1 (8 Jan.). Yi (W) by 1½.
Game 2 (15 Jan.). Pak (W) by resig.
Game 3 (22 Jan.). Yi (W) by resig.

Yi Ch'ang-ho wins 49th Kuksu

After two successive losses to Ch'oe Ch'eol-han, Yi Ch'ang-ho took back the Kuksu title from him in a seesaw match in which Black won every game. First prize is 20 million won.

Game 1 (25 Jan.). Yi (B) by resig.
Game 2 (2 Feb.). Ch'oe (B) by resig.
Game 3 (11 Feb.). Yi (B) by resig.
Game 4 (15 Feb.). Ch'oe (B) by resig.
Game 5 (2 March). Yi (B) by resig.



Pak Kiseong

Pak defends Kiseong title

Pak Yeong-hun 9-dan defeated An Cho-yeong 9-dan 3-0 in the 17th Kiseong title match and so defended the title he first won last year.


First prize is 18 million won, and second is six million.

Game 1 (17 March). Pak (B) by 2½.
Game 2 (29 March). Pak (W) by resig.
Game 3 (13 April). Pak (B) by resig.

Rui wins Women's Kuksu

In the 11th Women's Kuksu title match, Rui Naiwei 9-dan defeated Cho Hye-yeon 6-dan 2-0 and so regained the title that Cho took from her two years ago. First prize is ten million won and second is four million. Rui has now won this title four times.

Game 1 (20 Feb.). Rui (B) by resig.
Game 2 (20 March). Rui (W) by resig.



Yi Se-tol

7th 9-dan Successive Wins Strongest Player title

Yi Se-tol 9-dan defeated Ch'oe Ch'eol-han 9-dan 2-1 and so won this title for the second year in a row.

This is a fast-go tournament open to the 9-dans at the Hanguk Kiwon. Players qualify for the best-of-three final by scoring successive wins, but we do not have more exact details. The tournament has unusual time limits, with a 20-minute allowance followed by 40 seconds per move. Apparently, this tripped Ch'oe up in the final game, when he got confused about the time control on his 70th move.

First prize is 15 million won and second is five million.

Game 1 (22 Feb.). Yi (W) by resig.
Game 2 (26 Feb.). Ch'oe (W) by resig.
Game 3 (4 April). Yi (B) on time (after 69 moves).

News from China

Li wins King of New Stars

The best-of-three title match for the 13th King of the New Stars matched the 17-year-old Li Zhe 4-dan against the 23-year-old Wang Yao 6-dan. As befits this title, the younger player prevailed.

Game 1 (9 Feb.). Li (B) by resig.
Game 2 (10 Feb.). Wang (B) by resig.
Game 3 (11 Feb.). Li (B) by resig.

1st Ricoh Cup Pair Go

After eight terms as the Hitachi Cup, this professional pair-go tournament has switched sponsors. In the final, held on 3 March, the team of Ye Gui 3-dan and Kong Jie 7-dan (B) defeated Zheng Yan 2-dan and Yu Bin 9-dan by resignation.

First prize is 80,000 yuan and second is 40,000.



Wang Wei 8-dan

Wang Wei wins West-South Cup

In the final of the 5th West-South Cup, played on 18 March, Wang Wei 8-dan defeated Wang Xi 5-dan. First prize is 50,000 yuan and second 20,000.

News from Taiwan

Zhou wins 32nd Mingren

Zhou Junxun 9-dan beat Lin Shengxian 7-dan 4-1 to take the first prize of 100,000 Taiwanese dollars. The deciding game was played on 24 February.

2005 Prizes and the Year in Statistics

Japan

2005 Kido Prizes

Most outstanding player: Cho U Meijin (for the third year in a row – just for the record, Cho also won the Oza, NHK, and NEC Cups and two international titles, the LG Cup and the TV Asia).

Outstanding players: Hane Naoki Kisei, Takao Shinji Honinbo

New star: Iyama Yuta 7-dan

Women's Prize: Yashiro Kumiko, Women's Honinbo

International Prize: Cho U

Most wins: Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan (46 wins)

Best winning percentage: Iyama Yuta (75.47%)

Most successive wins: Takemiya Masaki (16)

Most games played: Cho U (63)



Her first title win gains Yashiro Kumiko the prize for the top woman player.

Shusai Prize

The 43rd Shusai Prize was awarded to Takao Shinji Honinbo on 15 February.

We are not certain why Takao won (the report in *Go Weekly* gave no details), as his achievements last year hardly match Cho U's, but we won't quibble.

Most prize money won

1. Cho U: ¥123,438,564 (about \$1,055,000)
2. Hane Naoki: ¥55,657,330
3. Takao Shinji: ¥47,231,810
4. Kobayashi Satoru: ¥34,925,000
5. Yoda Norimoto: ¥31,058,820
6. Yamashita Keigo: ¥28,244,123
7. Kono Rin: ¥23,020,822
8. O Rissei: ¥22,829,129
9. Cho Chikun: ¥21,731,054
10. O Meien: ¥21,248,512

The next nine players all made over ten million yen, but number 20 dropped below this

The next nine players all made over ten million yen, but number 20 dropped below this mark. Only one woman made the top 20. That was Cho's wife Kobayashi Izumi, who was number 19 with ¥10,253,405; this was the fifth time she topped the women professionals in earnings.

Most wins

1. Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan: 46 wins-16 losses.
2. So Yokoku 8-dan: 43-15
3. Kono Rin Tengen: 41-15
4. Iyama Yuta 7-dan: 40-13
5. Cho U Meijin: 39-24
6. Takao Shinji Honinbo: 35-14
7. Kim Shujun 7-dan: 33-16; Yamashita Keigo 9-dan: 33-20; Yamada Kimio 9-dan: 33-21
10. Komatsu Hideki 9-dan: 31-12

Among prominent players not making the top ten were: Hane Naoki Kisei, who was 15th with 28-18; Kobayashi Izumi 6-dan, the top woman player, in 17th place with 27-23; Cho Chikun Judan and Yoda Norimoto 9-dan were equal 20th, with 26-16 and 26-26 respectively. Yoda just avoided losing more games than he won for the first time in his career.

Leading the under-5-dan group were two women players, Kato Keiko 4-dan, on 28-14, and Xie Yimin 2-dan, on 28-18. Incidentally, the Taiwanese-born Xie, who is only 16, shows signs of developing into one of the top women players in Japan.

Our reference to under-5-dans notwithstanding, the restriction of this prize and the next three to players above 4-dan has been abolished, the main reason being the change in the tournament system, under which all ranks start out together in the first qualifying round (in other words, the lower-ranked players no longer get 'easy' games by being matched solely against each other). However, this did not affect the actual disposition of the prizes this time.

Most games played

1. Cho U Meijin: 63
2. Kobayashi Satoru: 62
3. So Yokoku, O Meien: 58
4. Kono Rin: 56
5. O Rissei: 55
6. Yamada Kimio: 54
7. Yamashita Keigo, Iyama Yuta: 53
9. Yoda Norimoto: 52
10. Kobayashi Izumi: 50

Most successive wins

1. Takemiya Masaki: 16
2. Kobayashi Satoru: 15

Best winning percentage

1. Iyama Yuta 7-dan: 75.47% (40-13)
2. Kobayashi Satoru (46-16), Yanaka Katsunori 8-dan (23-8): 74.2%

Korea

Prizes for 2005

These were announced at a ceremony held on 5 January.

- Most Outstanding Player: Yi Ch'ang-ho
- Most Popular Professional: Yi Ch'ang-ho
- Most Wins: Ch'oe Ch'eol-han (66 wins)
- Most Successive Wins: Cho Hun-hyeon (16)
- Best Winning Percentage: Yi Se-tol (74.7%)
- New Star: Kang Tong-yun

Most prize money won

1. Yi Se-tol: 621,700,000 won (about \$641,000)
2. Ch'oe Ch'eol-han: 518,300,000
3. Yi Ch'ang-ho: 506,300,000
4. Pak Yeong-hun: 295,600,000
5. Cho Han-seung: 137,200,000

China

Most prize money won

1. Chang Hao: 5,070,000 yuan (about \$634,000)
2. Gu Li: 1,180,000
3. Yu Bin: 1,140,000
4. Zhou Heyang: 1,040,000
5. Kong Jie: 760,000

Corrections

On page 2 of GW105, we wrote that Yi Se-tol was the first player to win the Fujitsu Cup three times, but this is wrong. He was preceded by Cho Hun-hyeon.

On page 9 of GW105, we wrote that Pak Cheong-sang was the sixth-ranked Korean, but this was contradicted by the list on page 7, which ranked him seventh.

The 30th Meijin Title Match: Cho U vs. Kobayashi Satoru



Now ranked as a veteran, Kobayashi Satoru was looking forward to his return to top-level play.

The predominant image of the 2005 Meijin title match was that it pitted a young star against a veteran. At first, it was hard to accept, at least as far as title matches were concerned, that Kobayashi Satoru, who has always looked very youthful for his age, now represented the older generation, but the fact was that he had turned 46 and the previous year became a grandfather (his daughter is married to Ko Reibun 4-dan).

Actually, Kobayashi approached the title match with a mixture of anticipation and anxiety. The cause of the latter was his relatively long absence from the title-match arena — his last big-three experience was in the mid-90s: he won the Kisei title from Cho Chikun in 1995, lost it to the same player in 1996 and unsuccessfully challenged in 1997. For a player with his talent, eight years is a long time to go without playing in a title match. Even though he had a total of nine titles to his name, he commented, ‘I’m like a newcomer.’

Kobayashi was very disappointed when he lost to Cho U in the play-off to decide the Meijin challenger in 2004. At the time, he was afraid that that might have been his last chance. However, he enjoyed superb form in 2005 and kept the lead in the most-wins list virtually throughout the year. Once again, he tied for first place in the Meijin League and this time he made no mistake, defeating Yamashita Keigo in the play-off; if he could beat Cho U in the title match, the year’s delay would be wiped out.

Cho U, the defending champion, had had a mixed year so far: he had won two international titles but had lost the Honinbo title by a one-sided score. Still, going into this match, he held six titles (the others were the Oza, NHK Cup, NEC Cup, LG Cup, and the TV Asia), so it’s hardly permissible to say that he was in any kind of slump. Perhaps he could complain of being overworked, but that’s unavoidable if you keep winning. The only thing is that his record since losing the Honinbo title was 4–7, which seemed to offer encouragement to Kobayashi fans.

Game One: Decided in the opening

White: Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan

Black: Cho U Meijin

Played at the Hotel Sunlife Garden in Hiratsuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture on 7 & 8 September 2005.

Based on a commentary by Oya Koichi 9-dan, with reference to Monthly Go World. Report by Naito Yukiko.





Figure 1 (1–21)

Figure 1 (1–21). Kobayashi’s first big regret


As our heading above has it, this game was really decided in the opening, so that’s what the commentary focusses on. By move 45, the defending Meijin had taken control of the whole board and secured a safe lead. The main reasons were two moves that Kobayashi inexplicably failed to play.




Dia. 1: giving Black an ideal move

White 8. Territorially, the most profitable way to play would be the common joseki shown in *Dia. 1*. However, in this case, Black 6 will be the ideal combination of extension and pincer (against 4 in the figure). Takemiya Masaki 9-dan commented: 'This way the game would already feel bad for White.'

Black 9, which is standard when White has made a two-space pincer, is a move recommended by Cho's father-in-law Kobayashi Koichi, though we don't know if Cho was influenced by him. Playing it with the narrow pincer is a recent innovation.



Dia. 2: Black is thick




Dia. 3: profit for Black


White 10 is the most aggressive answer. If instead White attaches at 1 in *Dia. 2*, Black gets a ponnuki and builds thickness, which would not be to White's liking. Jumping along the diagonal to 1 in *Dia. 3* is conceivable, but it lets Black take a lot of territory. Kobayashi commented: 'This would just make Black happy.'

Black 17 took Kobayashi by surprise. The move usually played so far was the jump to 1 in *Dia. 4*; Black has to be prepared for a tough fight when White attaches at 2. Next —


Dia. 5. Pushing up with 3 is natural, but White counters with 4 (an essential move) to 8; if Black follows his natural momentum and continues with 9, he collapses after 10 to 14. Therefore, instead of 9 —



Dia. 4: White's counter



Dia. 5: disaster



Dia. 6: good for White

Dia. 6. Black has to back up with 9 here, but White gets a good result with 10 to 14. The marked stone is now ideally located [Black can't attack it with a pincer, because his group to the left is too weak].


Black 17 is an innovation by Cho. It was highly praised by the players following the game. [It deprives White of the sente move at 4 in *Dia. 5*.] Immediately, the gears of Kobayashi's game stopped meshing — White 18 was the move he regretted most in this game.

Instead of 18, White 1 in *Dia. 7* (next page) is the vital point. White can force with 'a'—Black 'b'—White 'c', so he is strong on the left side. After 2, jumping to 3 now is the right rhythm. 'I wanted to play 1, but for some reason that's not where my hand went,' lamented Kobayashi after the game. He also commented that when playing the move he believed that 18 was good enough, as it made miai of the top and left sides.

Black 19 is an ideal extension: the contrast to *Dia. 7* is striking.

Black 21. Having gained on the side, Black treats 7 and 11 as light stones. This is an example of the flexibility Cho is known for.

After 21, Kobayashi made the second move that he was to regret.



Dia. 7: the vital point





Figure 2 (22-60)




Dia. 8: an improvement for White 22

Figure 2 (22-60). The second cause for regret

Kobayashi also expressed keen regret after the game about White 22, though the players in the pressroom didn't query it at the time. Kobayashi: 'I really shouldn't have played 22. White should at least attach at 1 in *Dia. 8*. Black

doesn't have a base, so things won't be easy for him.' If Black 2 and 4, White continues the attack with 5. This will be tough for Black, so he might switch to 4 in *Dia. 9*, but White would be satisfied with 5 and 7. If instead Black plays 4 at 'a', White plays 'b' and gets a better result than in the game.


White 1 in these diagrams is a good move, but once again Kobayashi failed to play the move he wanted to. After 25, he became fed up with his game. The unfortunate thing in go is that your bad moves remain on the board, unlike chess or shogi, so it's harder to forget them because you see them every time you look at the board.



Dia. 9: better than the game

With 28, White sets out to capture the three stones (23 etc.) to the left, but Black is only too happy to discard them. They are clinging to a rock-solid white position, so he has no more use for them. Considering that he started out with nothing at the centre top, Black can be very satisfied with the result to 37. Cho: 'I thought that sacrificing my stones gave me a bit of a lead.' Kobayashi: 'White didn't have a move [after 31]. This made my head ache.'

Black 39 surprised the spectators. With his territorial style, you would expect Cho to hane at 1 in *Dia. 10*. He commented that he was worried that White might omit 2, simply descending at 4 and aiming at the placement at 'a'. It's true that Black doesn't have a good way of defending against 'a', but another way to look at it is that in the game Black is trying to simplify. When he switches to 45, he has a definite lead. The game has been decided on the opening day.



Dia. 10: more territorial

White's only chance is to start a fight, but when he attaches at 46, Black again simplifies with 47 to 51, giving up a stone. White gets his fight with 52, but Black has no trouble extricating his stone.

Afternoon tea with fruit and cakes was brought in at this point, but the state of the game seemed to affect the players. Cho ate up with a healthy appetite, but Kobayashi didn't touch the food.




Figure 3 (61-100)

Figure 3 (61-100). *Black takes control.*

Up to 63, Black has in effect driven a wedge between two white groups; this is not usually something White would welcome, yet he is the one who has brought it about. That shows how tough the game is for him. With 65, Black has solidified the bottom area, so his position has improved.

White 66 stops Black from linking up with A-White B-Black C.

Black has few worries when he jumps out to 73 and secures his corner eye shape with 77.

White 80 is a do-or-die move. Again, it lets Black split him into two with 81 (the sealed move), which doesn't look good for White. In fact, Kobayashi commented later: 'The instant I saw this move, I thought I had lost. I had thought that it would become an endgame contest if Black answered at D.' When Black answers at 81, White's follow-up aim is attaching at E, but to do this now would be too risky. He therefore switches to 82, scattering stones about the board and hoping for complications.

White 94. 'I'm attacking on dame points,' Kobayashi muttered as he played this move.

White loses the option of attaching at E, but that can't be helped.





Figure 4 (101-135)



Dia. 11: an eyeless group

Figure 4 (101-135). *A convincing win for Cho*

Black 7 is severe. White could maintain his connection with 8 at 1 in *Dia. 11*, but then the whole group would be eyeless after Black 2 and 4.

Cutting off half of the white group with 17 and 19 is more than enough.

White 24 and 26 set the scene for resignation. If White plays 24 at 28, Black plays at 24 and secures a lead of 15 points on the board.

The game ended quite early, at 1:28 p.m. Cho had used five hours 23 minutes and Kobayashi 5 hours 31 minutes.

Although Black took the lead in the opening, the actual margin at that stage was not such a big one. The problem for the challenger was that he was unable to recover from the psychological damage suffered on the first day of the game. Kobayashi's return to two-day go was not an auspicious one.

White resigns after Black 135.

(*Monthly Go World* [Dias. 5 to 8] and *The Asahi Newspaper*)

Game Two: A costly mistake in timing

White: Cho U

Black: Kobayashi Satoru

Played at the JAL Resort Seahawk Hotel Fukuoka on 22 & 23 September 2005.

Commentary by Kobayashi Koichi 9-dan. Report by Konishi Taizo 8-dan.





Figure 1 (1-29)



Dia. 1: Cho's inspiration

Figure 1 (1-29). Cho's innovation

Black 7. Playing the same pincer with which he got a bad result in the first game is a sign of stubbornness on Kobayashi's part. Cho counters with another innovation, White 8.


Kobayashi Koichi: 'This move is not played on the spur of the moment. Previously, White 1 and 3 in *Dia. 1* were played against Cho by a

young Korean player. Presumably, Cho thinks that keeping the 1-2 exchange in reserve gives more breadth to White's strategy. Black's answer at 9 is a severe move, typical of Satoru.'

White 10 has a deep meaning. It is a probe: will Black answer at 11 or A?

Black 13. Answering at B would be insipid — starting a fight with 13 is natural.

KK: 'The crosscut of 14 and 16 is a technique for settling a group. I approve of going for the centre with 17. One would be reluctant to play 1 to 5 in *Dia. 2*, as it would make Black a little overconcentrated. Black takes sente and reinforces with 21, which is the proper move.'



Dia. 2: overconcentrated Dia. 3: a ko for later

Black 21 forestalls the sequence shown in *Dia. 3*. After 8, White switches elsewhere; there's a ko fight left in the corner with Black 'a' through White 'f'.

The fight started by Cho's new move at 8 comes to an end with 21. 'An equal result' was the commentator's verdict.

A common sequence follows with 22 to 29. White can claim that his spear point of 28 reduces Black's bottom right influence. Black can be satisfied with having developed in the wider areas with 25 and 29.

Figure 2 (30-45). A query about Cho's strategy

White 30. KK: 'White 30 is a steady move, but permitting Black to occupy the ideal large point of 33 makes the game tough for White, I think.' This is the first important point of this game.

According to Kobayashi, White should hasten to play 1 in *Dia. 4*. The continuation to White

5 splits the board up into small positions and makes a close game very likely. If instead Black plays 2 and 4 in *Dia. 5*, White plays 5 and 7 and it's hard to imagine he'll have any problems. Playing 5 at 'a' now would still be superior to the game.






Figure 2 (30-45)




Dia. 4: correct for White 30?



Dia. 5: White is satisfied

KK: 'White's only worry is that Black may threaten his base by invading at the 3-3 with 2 in *Dia. 6*, but I think that he can handle the fight adequately with 3 to 15.' Note that if White plays 9 at 10, Black 'a' will be a nuisance. If Black plays the usual move of 'b' instead of 8, White plays 10 and has no problems. This diagram is the most aggressive strategy for Black, but White has nothing to fear. Therefore, Kobayashi maintained strongly that White should play at 1 or, to put it another way, that he must not cede this point to Black.




Dia. 6: White can handle the fight

Black 33 combines well with Black's thickness on the right: it is the only move. If White invades at A, Black will exchange B for White C, then switch to D. Securing a square-shaped territory like this would be too big to allow.

White's moves from 36 to 40 have their own rhythm, but Black secures the lead when he occupies the large point of 41. In particular, the last move is a relaxed move typical of Satoru.


Cho has a solid reputation for his skill in the infighting. It goes without saying that this is supported by his deep reading and his precision. KK: 'His skills are, if anything, more conspicuous in *shinogi* (rescuing groups in trouble) than in attack.' We get some confirmation of that in this figure.

Black 41, which was praised by the commentator, is linked with the next move. Black 1 in *Dia. 7* is also a splendid move and a natural one. Probably more people would choose it than 41. If next Black 3, White 4 and 6 work well, eliminating the aji of Black 'a' (White answers at 'b' and nothing happens).



Dia. 7: the standard strategy

KK: 'If after 41 and 43 White uses 44 to play 1 and 3 in *Dia. 8* (next page), then the good location of the marked stone shines out.' The comparison with *Dia. 7* makes this clear. White might throw in a twist, playing 3 in *Dia. 8* at 'a', so that he can aim at 'b', but then his corner is not as satisfactory as in *Dia. 7*. For all these reasons, White plays patiently with 44 — whereupon Black boldly launches an attack with 45.



Dia. 8: better for Black





Figure 3 (46-79)



Dia. 9: not advisable

Figure 3 (46-79). *The turning point of the game*

KK: 'White is faced with a tough position, but he doesn't simply try to flee. He works hard to reduce Black with 50 and 52-64 while also trying to augment his eye shape. The nimbleness of White's play is typical of Cho.'

Depending on how things work out, White is even aiming at a counterattack on the black stones on the right that have been cut off from their fellows.

Black's response is appropriate. For example, Black 55 — if Black played at 1 in *Dia. 9* to help his stones to the right, White could aim at splitting him into two on the left with 'a'—Black 'b'—White 'c', so this is actually more unpleasant for Black.


In this attack, Black has developed on the outside with 49 and 51, so of course he is satisfied. His attack continues.

In the course of a game, there are scenes that change the flow of the game and become turning points. Such a scene occurs in the play around this point.


With the centre top white group still weak, Black has the initiative. His deliberate, one-step-at-a-time attack shows Kobayashi's confidence in his position. He presumably concluded that the shortcut to victory was to play first at the bottom and to swallow up the white stones on the bottom right.

When Kobayashi played 71, he must have felt that he had made up for his failure in the first game and that the Meijin contest was back to even. But his triumph lasted only an instant.

KK: 'Black 73 is the second main point of this game. Satoru probably planned to force with good aji as in *Dia. 10*. However, his plan was upset immediately when White answered at 74.'



Dia. 10: Kobayashi's intention



Dia. 11: Black keeps the lead

This move didn't change the lead, but it seems undeniable that it upset Black by diverging from the path to victory he had hypothesized.

KK: 'Black should have followed *Dia. 11*. The moves from 6 are the likely continuation. If White plunges in at 12, Black gives way with 13. He keeps a lead of ten points on the board.' [In contrast to 73 in the figure] White has no choice about 2. If White plays 6 at 8, he won't be happy when Black counters with 6-White 'a'-Black 16, threatening the centre group.

It might not be too much to say that the difference in timing between 73 in the figure and 1 and 3 in *Dia. 11* decided the game.

The large territory Black was counting on in the bottom right has disappeared. However, the centre white group is still thin; there's no big difference in territory, so the game is still a contest.





Figure 4 (80-100)



Dia. 12: a trap

Figure 4 (80-100). White takes the lead.

KK: 'White 80 is a good move. It threatens Black's knight's-move link, inviting 81 and 83 and making sure of White's own connection with 84.'

White next switches to 86, the largest point on the board. The territorial balance has collapsed. Yet if Black plays 85 at A, White plays at B, forcing Black to link up with C, which is painful.

White 90. White 1 in *Dia. 12* would be a mistake: Black strikes with 2 to 8.

The impression in this and the previous figure is that White has done well in various areas of the board.





Figure 5 (101-150)



Dia. 13: not an upset
13: ko

Figure 5 (101-150). Already decided

At some point, the difference in territory has become definite and the game has tilted in White's favour. If White keeps a watchful eye on his large group and handles the endgame without slacking up, he should win by the komi.

White 2 and 4 may look like ordinary moves, but White is playing carefully. Up to 8, he takes care of the large group.

Black 9 blocks White's path here, but there was a theory that this was slack and the losing move.

KK: 'This is the theory that Black should play at A and aim at a ko. If Black plays elsewhere with 9, the biggest move is probably 1 in *Dia. 13*. White plays out at 2. Black can start a ko with 3 to 9, but White boldly moves through

the centre with 14. Black can't hope to win this ko. The issue has already been decided — I don't believe that Black 9 can be called the losing move.'




Figure 6 (151–200)




Figure 7 (201–241)

24: retakes (above 13); 38: connects (at 29);
41: connects (left of 39)

Figures 6 & 7

Kobayashi Koichi's conclusion: 'Maybe we can't identify the actual losing move, but Black 73 in Figure 3 was certainly a factor in Black's loss.'

White wins by 6½ points.

(Monthly Go World, November 2005)

Game Three

Kobayashi drops a good game

White: Kobayashi Satoru

Black: Cho U

Played at the Tokiwa Hotel, Kofu City, Yamana-shi Prefecture on 28 & 29 September 2005.

Commentary by Ishida Yoshio 9-dan. Report by Kawakuma Hiroyuki.






Figure 1 (1–40)

21: connects



Dia. 1: good for Black Dia. 2: Black satisfied



Dia. 3: good for Black

Figure 1 (1–40). Cho takes early profit.

Black 1 and 3 are a pattern Cho was fond of when he was younger. If Black 5 and 7 follow, one might feel that Black 1 would be better lo-

cated at 19, but Cho believes in this pattern.

The sequence from 8 to 26 is one that looks possible but is actually quite rare. Locally, Black has no reason to be dissatisfied. Well, then, how could White have avoided this result?

White 12 is a major turning point. The first move you'd think of is probably pushing along with 1 in *Dia. 1*, but I'm not enthusiastic about it. Because, after White backs up with 3, the marked black stone is comfortably located. If this move were at 'a', White could look forward to attacking at 'b'.

Dia. 2. If White 1 and 3, Black pulls back at 4. Since the marked black stone is not at 'a', Black more or less gets sente.

Dia. 3. White 1 is also possible, but Cho might push down the way he did in the Honinbo title match [Game 4]. Again, the marked black stone shines because of its comfortable position. Perhaps *Dia. 2* is the safest variation.

Black 27 is a key point: it expands the bottom right while aiming at setting 11 and 13 in motion. White 28 is meant to deter Black from doing the latter. White invests a lot of moves in this area: White 30 and later White 42 in the next figure. The initial result in the corner was a division of profit for Black and influence for White, so White's adding extra moves here naturally leads to Black's taking the lead in territory and White's staking the game on catching up.

I consider Black 27 the focal point of this game. If this stone has an easy time of it, the game will be hard for White to win. That means that White's principal aim is the invasion at A. If Black 27 comes under pressure, White's influence will prove its worth.

White 40. White B is also conceivable. White would welcome the fight after Black 40–White C, as he is left with White D.

Figure 2 (41–52). A high invasion

Black 41 is shrewd. Even if White gets a stone at 42, the three black stones have not yet been captured.

I agree with the high invasion of 44 and the cap of 46, as this game looks like developing into a centre fight. If White fights too hard at the bottom, the aim of White A will become more distant.

Black 49 is an all-out move. That means that White could have considered countering with 1 in *Dia. 4*. If Black resists with 2, the continuation to 11 is bad for him. He's been forced into a low position, on top of which White is left with the

squeeze of 'a'–Black 'b'–White 'c', so Black's eye shape at the bottom has been weakened. In short, this places a heavy burden on Black. Instead of 2 —







Figure 2 (41–52)



Dia. 4: good for White



Dia. 5: Black's counter



Dia. 6: both sides satisfied

Dia. 5. Black will probably answer with 2 here. After 7 —

Dia. 6. The sequence from 1 is conceivable, but White defends with 12, and this is a reasonable game, in my opinion.





Figure 3 (53-100)



Dia. 7: better for 56 Dia. 8: the threat of a ko

Figure 3 (53-100). The biggest missed opportunity of the game

Black 53 is a reasonable answer to White 52. Forcing with 54 is good, but 56 is a mistake. I heard that Kobayashi greatly regretted this move. It is the biggest missed opportunity of the game.

It's certainly true that 56 breaks into the bottom area. However, in this game, defending with 59 is bigger. I wouldn't be surprised if Cho believed that the game was unloseable for him after this move.

Instead of 56, I think that invading at 1 in Dia. 7 is the only move. As mentioned earlier, this is the vital point of this game. It's a mystery to me why Kobayashi passed up the opportunity to play here.

If Black 2 in Dia. 7, White plays 3. His thickness in the top right, on which he has invested so many moves, starts to work effectively. Even if Black plays 2 at 'a', White still plays 3 — he should be able to find a way to use his thickness in attack. Above all, Black 'a' would leave White with White 2. At some stage, Black will have to return there and reinforce, so it will be possible for White to play two successive moves in the centre.

After letting Black defend with 59, White has no choice but to enclose with 60. For White, who wanted to turn the game into a fight, this result is a big miscalculation.

I also have doubts about the exchange of 72 for 73. I realize that fighting a ko as in Dia. 8 — with White 'a' and Black 'b' after 1 to 4 — will be difficult, but provoking Black 73 removes a worry for Black. Instead of 72, it would have been better to play around A and let the threat of Dia. 8 prey on Black's mind,

Cho's decisiveness in playing 75 etc. in the centre shows good judgement: he believes that this way Black can't lose. Black certainly has a big lead.




Figure 4 (101-155)

Figure 4 (101-155). Cho wraps up the game perfectly.

When White gets 6 in place, he can capture four black stones. However, Cho has already included this in his calculations and he hands over the four stones with a good grace. Instead of 2, White could also have cut at 5, enabling him to cut off the marked stone with Black A-White 2-Black B-White 3. However, this variation

doesn't put a white stone at 6, so the capturing move of 8 disappears. You can't have it both ways.

When Cho played 15 and 17, he was probably completely confident of victory. Playing White 6 at 17 might have been a good move, in the sense that it might have made it easier to create complications. This cut would be quite a big move.

White 52. White tries to enclose territory because there's nothing else to do, but reducing with Black 55 is good enough.

Figure 5 (156–213). Three up

White does not concentrate on surrounding territory in the centre (for example, 66, 70, 74, etc.), so Black actually ends up getting more territory there.

Black 79 works. The cut of Black 105 makes miai of capturing three stones with A and four stones with B. At the end, the gap, even after deducting komi, is some ten points.

Black wins by resignation.
(Monthly Go World, November 2005)




Figure 5 (156–213)
88: ko (at 82)



Cho U jolts the challenger by taking a 3–0 lead.

Game Four: Thickness turns the tide

White: Cho U

Black: Kobayashi Satoru

Played at the Nagoya Tokyu Hotel on 11 & 12 October 2005.

Report by Ito Hiroki (based on the analysis in the game-review room during the game).




Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 1 (1-50). Black goes for thickness.

With both players making a leisurely start, with the diagonal move of 6 and the large-knight enclosures of 7 and 8, this game has a nostalgic feel about it. The high move of 9 raises the value of the top, and Black contrives to develop there first with 11 and 13.

Apparently, Cho was not happy to see Black take the point of 13. After 14 and 15, he considered pressing at A, but changed his mind. He thought for 67 minutes, then switched to 16.

White 18 and 20 are a tesuji for settling oneself. Making an atari at 21 before playing 23 and 25 is well timed. A kind of trade follows to 33. The professionals following the game were impressed with the size of Black's profit.


White goes all out with the checking extension of 34. Black makes a taut shape with 41.

White 42 hopes for Black 1 in *Dia. 1*, in which case White will continue with 2 to 6. However, Black ignores it, going back to reinforce at 43. Emphasizing thickness like this is a bold strategy.

Figure 2 (51-100). Kobayashi takes the lead.

Having stored up strength above, Black pulls

out his stone below with 55. In the continuation from 56 (the sealed move), White has to play a number of moves on the second line to link up, so Black seizes the initiative. Being forced so low looks painful for White. Ogata Masaki 9-dan, the Asahi commentator, maintained that White should have used 58 to play 1 to 5 in *Dia. 2*, even though this has the drawback of letting Black secure his own group.



Dia. 1: White's aim *Dia. 2: better for White?*





Figure 2 (51-100)

Black reduces the right side with 71 and 73, then attacks at the top with 75. Instead of 76, White would like to make good shape with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 3*, but Black will exchange A for B in the figure, creating the good ko threat of C, then challenge White to a ko fight with 'a'. This would put White on the spot.



Dia. 3: a difficult fight for White

When Black gets a stone at 89, White is forced to link up to the left with the tesuji of 92. In return, he has to abandon the two marked stones. Black automatically acquires centre territory with 95 and 97 and is also left with the large endgame move of D. He has taken the lead.






Figure 3 (101-150)
27: ko; 29: connects



Dia. 4: good for White



Dia. 5: correct for 111

Figure 3 (101-150). Both sides go wrong.

The challenger had played his natural style and seemed to be on the verge of picking up his first win.


Black 11. 'This was awful,' lamented Kobayashi. 'I hallucinated.' When White plays out at 12 on the other side, Black is at a loss for a move. For example —

Dia. 4. If Black plays 1 to 5, he can capture five white stones, but he faces a tough fight when White attacks his group below. Kobayashi indicated after the game that he was reluctant to follow this diagram. Ogata differed: 'For better or for worse, Black may have had no choice but to follow *Dia. 4*.' His reason for saying this is that in the game White gets a chance to win.

Going back a little, the correct move for 11 was Black 1 in *Dia. 5*. After Black links up with 3, White must add a move at 4, so Black attaches at 5. He can aim at setting up a ko with Black 'a' through 'i'. If White defends the right side, Black calmly attacks the bottom corner with 'j'.

Kobayashi staked everything on the attachment of 13. In response to 16, he switches to 17 and 19 — this fight is crucial for both sides.

White 20. Cho misses a chance to clinch the game. Instead of 20, simply pushing up with 22 would be more severe — see *Dia. 6*.




Dia. 6: White's chance
6: connects

Dia. 6. White should push up at 1. Black's dumpling won't be captured, but it will have to flee ignominiously. This result would have given White a definite lead. [*Go Weekly* gave the continuation shown in *Dia. 7* on the next page, with the comment that the game would be promising for White.]

Black recovers considerably when he lives on a large scale in the corner with 31 and 33.

The final contest will take place on the right side. Cho, who has a very small lead, attacks with 40 and 42: he seems to be half in earnest about capturing the group. However, was this really the best strategy? The players in the game-review room concluded that White would have scored a narrow win if he had played 40 at 46, expanding territory while letting Black escape.

Black 43 is an effective move (if White omits 44, Black cuts at A); the black group is out of danger after Black 45 and 47.



Dia. 7 (8-27): good for White




Figure 4 (151-200)

Figure 4 (151-200). Kobayashi takes the lead again.

When Black lives with 55, he has succeeded in upsetting White's lead.

Figure 5 (201-259). Kobayashi stays alive.

This win kept Kobayashi's challenge alive. He had a little bit of luck, but, going by the flow of the whole game, he deserved to win.

Incidentally, this was the first time in this series that Cho went into byo-yomi (he used seven hours 58 minutes to Kobayashi's six hours 20 minutes).

Black wins by 3½ points.

(*Monthly Go World*, December 2005, and *Go Weekly*, 24 October 2005)




Figure 5 (201-259)
38: retakes (left of 37)



Just as well Nagoya wasn't the end.
(There is a pun on 'owari', meaning 'end', and 'Owari', the feudal fief centring on Nagoya.)
(Cartoon by Ayuzawa Makoto)

Game Five: In hot pursuit

White: Kobayashi Satoru

Black: Cho U

Played at the Goshobo Inn, Kobe City, Hyogo Prefecture on 19 & 20 October 2005.

Commentary by Imamura Toshiya 9-dan. Report by Naito Yukiko.

Figure 1 (1-51). An unusual opening

White 10, an approach move that feels more like an invasion, is unusual. In the pressroom, Ishii Kunio 9-dan, the referee, and Imamura both exclaimed: 'I've never seen this before.' Black 11, which expands the battlefront, added to their surprise. Ishii: 'This surpasses the imagination.'






Figure 1 (1-51)



Dia. 1: sacrifice

Dia. 2: a perilous fight



Dia. 3: moving out

Dia. 4: settled

Kobayashi: 'I haven't researched this move, but I've often wondered how Black would answer it.' He added that, if Black had played at A, 'I planned to cap at 19. I didn't expect Black 11.'

Black 15. Black could also tenuki, capturing the stone at the top by pressing at B. White would attach at C, and the game would be more peaceful.

A skirmish starts with White 16. White 22 makes miai of 23 and 24. Cho apparently ex-

pected White to jump to D, which he planned to answer at 33.


When White extends to 24, Black goes for a trade with 25 to 29. An interesting variation would follow if Black played 27 at 1 in *Dia. 1*. The sequence to 24 is a one-way street. Black gains from splitting White into two up to 21, but in return he sacrifices eight stones. Imamura: 'The result looks even, but Cho Meijin doesn't like giving the opponent territory.'

White 30 is natural: it takes territory and threatens Black's base.

Cho regretted giving White a chance to set 10 in motion. 'Should I have played 31 at E?' he asked in the game review. White will cap at 1 in *Dia. 2* and 2 to 5 will follow. 'This was the only way to play. It's perilous, though,' said Cho.

The players in the pressroom expected Kobayashi to do something in the top right immediately with 32. There are two main variations, shown in *Dias. 3* and *4*. Either way, moving out as in the former or settling his group as in the latter, the result is reasonable for White. Instead, White jumps down to 32, letting Black occupy the good point of 33 — White now has two weak groups [counting 10 as a group], which looks tough for him. 'I would follow the diagrams,' said Imamura. Kobayashi: 'Surely you fight here. A head-on clash is the only way.' In short, the black group at the centre top looked weak to Kobayashi.

White 34 again surprised the players in the pressroom. This is not a move seeking to settle oneself but rather one looking for a fight.



Dia. 5: good for White

Black attacks up to 39, but then White attacks from the rear with 40, taking aim at Black's thinness. If Black simply defends with 41 at 1 in *Dia. 5*, White attaches at 2. If Black 3 to 7 follow, White 8 makes miai of blocking at 'a' and peeping at 'b', so Black collapses. In the game review, Cho commented that Black 39 at 40 would have felt better.

Black secures his corner group with 41 to 45, then tries to patch up his centre thinness with 51.







Figure 2 (52-74)



Dia. 6: better for 52



Dia. 7: cut into two



Dia. 8: trouble for White

Figure 2 (52-74). Cho's slip

White 52 is too slow: it causes White to come under a lot of pressure. Instead, Imamura suggested cutting across the knight's move with 1 in *Dia. 6*, which would make it possible for White to move out with 9. After the game, Kobayashi agreed that this would have been far better than what he played. Instead of Black 4 —

Dia. 7. If Black plays at 1, White can cut with 2 and 4.


Kobayashi: 'I had no sense of crisis. This wasn't the time or place to block. It was slack.'

The peep of 53 spells trouble for White. If he connects at 1 in *Dia. 8*, Black rams into him with 2; Black can now answer White 3 with 4, so the eye shape of the top right white group is pretty shaky.

Black surrounds White with 57, but White has the clever combination of 58 and 60 to link up. However, Black A will be sente, so White is left with a cutting point at B.

When Black switches to 61, the game looks promising for him, according to Imamura. Cho also commented that he thought he was a little ahead.


If Black plays at 1 in *Dia. 9*, White can't answer at 2, as Black can continue with 3 to 7, forcing White to fight a ko. In order to preempt this diagram, White plays 62 and 64. Kobayashi: 'An ordinary player wouldn't notice 62. I'm proud of this move.' The aim of 62 becomes apparent a little later.



Dia. 9: Black's threat

When Black plays a second successive move at the bottom with 67, the game looks tough for White.

White 68 was the sealed move. Cho answered it after just a minute's thought, but 69 was the move he regretted most in the game. Cho: 'This was terrible. I had always planned to answer 68 by pulling back at 70, yet suddenly I changed my mind. I don't even know myself why I blocked.'



Dia. 10: Black could be optimistic

If Black played at 70, White could be expected to switch to 1 in *Dia. 10*, followed by 2 to 10. Imamura: 'The issue would still be undecided, but the game would be slightly easier for Black than for White.'

When Black plays 69 at 70, White is left with the endgame placement of C, so 69 is a little tighter territorially. However, thanks to the atari of 72, cutting at 74 becomes possible. This cut is a blind spot, because Black has already reinforced with 65. The difference White 72 makes is that White can answer Black D by connecting at E. Therefore —





Figure 3 (75-100)

Figure 3 (75-100). No joy for Black

Black has no choice but to move out with 75 and 77, but having to link up on the worthless point of 85 is painful.

Black 93 aims at cutting at 95, but capturing at 97 now brings Black no joy: the whole group is still eyeless. What really vexes Black is that the sacrifice of 93 (necessary to prevent White 96 at 97) gives White definite eye shape.



Dia. 11: not to Kobayashi's liking

Figure 4 (101-150). A Cho special

White 4. White tenukies for the third time in the bottom left corner. After 4, White 15 will be sente, so White can slide to 12.

White 16. The players following the game thought that White could have connected at 1 in Dia. 11. Kobayashi: 'If Black lives up to 4, White has to make an all-out assault on the right-

side black group. I didn't like the idea of that.'

White 18. White A is correct — the difference in territory is equivalent to the komi.

Black goes all out with 19 etc., but even so the game is now even on the board




Figure 4 (101-150)

Black 35 is a move that shows you can never relax against Cho. It caused a shock wave in the pressroom, where no one had seen it coming. If, after 37, White connects at 41, Black attaches at B and blocks off the centre. On top of that, if Black connects at 48, White will have to link up with C, but then Black would pick up five stones with D-White E-Black 40; in other words, Black B would be sente. That would immediately put the game up for grabs. 'How does Cho come up with these moves?' wondered Ishii Kunio.

Kobayashi admitted that 35 took him by surprise, but after just one minute's thought he eliminated all potential problems by reinforcing with 40.

White 50 keeps the lead.







Figure 5 (151-200)



Dia. 12: wrapping up the game

Figure 5 (151-200). Prolonging the game

White 62. White misses a chance to decide the game: White 1 in *Dia. 12*. Black's territory would disappear if he permitted White 'a', so 2 is forced, but then White 3 and 5 bring the centre stones back to life. That means that the black group automatically dies. Cutting with Black 6 doesn't work. White 62 needlessly prolongs the game.

Black secures the bottom left area up to 65 and attacks the centre stones with 67, but he is still behind.

Incidentally, today it was Cho who didn't touch the fruit and Japanese cakes brought in for afternoon tea at 3 o'clock.

Figure 6 (201-259). Back in contention

After winning the fourth game, Kobayashi commented: 'If I win the fifth game too, I think I have a chance.' In this game, he had the upper hand and put a lot of pressure on Cho — he was in the series with a vengeance.

White wins by $1\frac{1}{2}$ points.
(The Asahi Newspaper)




Figure 6 (201-259)

5: connects (left of 3); 59: connects (at 52)

Game Six: Decided at the last minute

White: Cho U

Black: Kobayashi Satoru

Played at the Wakatsuki Annex, Ito City, Shizuoka Prefecture on 3 & 4 November 2005.

Commentary by O Rissei 9-dan. Report by Akiyama Kenji.




Figure 1 (1-50)


Figure 1 (1-50). A very difficult game

I had my first experience of acting as referee at this game. I was just as tense as if I were play-

ing. What if there were an incident or if my voice failed me when I had to announce the beginning of the game? I was quite nervous, but unnecessarily so: I didn't fluff my part.

However, the game was a frighteningly difficult one. Asking me to explain it is unreasonable. Fortunately, I had some strong allies in the newspaper commentator Mizokami Tomochika and the satellite-TV commentator Michael Redmond, so I'm going to avail myself of their assistance.

This was a very interesting series for the spectator. There was no end of interesting moves like Black 7 in answer to the two-space pincer. I hear that this move has been around for a long time, but recently it has mainly appeared in international tournaments.



Dia. 1: also possible

White 8 is not the only move. Taking up position with 1 in *Dia. 1* would also be a good strategy. If Black 2 and 4, White presses at 5, forcing Black to link up with 6. White is satisfied because of Black's low position.

White 8 is an expression of intent: White seeks a frontal clash.


Kobayashi's next move is natural. There's nothing to be gained by fighting in the bottom left corner where White has built up strength.

White 10 is a difficult point. Mizokami maintained that White should play at A or 42. I'd choose the latter. The small-knight's move finishes with the corner in one move, whereas 10 makes the extension to 14 necessary. That's the difference. If White omits 14, Black 31 will be severe. Cho Meijin probably had a tough time choosing between making good shape with two moves and finishing off the corner with one move.

Black 15 is more severe now that Black has built a solid position to the right. He piles on the pressure with 17; at this point, I think you can say that Black is doing well.

The timing of the forcing move of 20 is risky. Instead of Black 25, Mizokami suggested 1

in *Dia. 2*; if White 2, Black attacks vigorously with 3 or 'a'. This suggestion poses another difficult problem. On the surface, it looks as if Black is fighting hard, but there's a risk that White will exploit his thinness with an attack from the rear. I can understand why Kobayashi played more conservatively. Having come this far, it's natural to become cautious.



Dia. 2: Black is thin

Even so, moving out with 27, which just invites White to jump to 28, is a strategy I couldn't adopt. Setting up the Chinese Opening at the top is perhaps best, though I don't know whether Black should play high or low.


'I thought of 27 and 29 as a set,' Kobayashi commented in the game review. The latter move aims at 31, so I guess this is a good strategy.

Black goes all out with 37. If he plays the proper move of B, presumably he's unhappy with White C.

White gets to play first at the top with 38 and 40, yet Black goes for more profit with 41. I often play like this, but it's unusual for Kobayashi.

White 46. I would press at D. Since Black is going to invade at 49, it looks better for White to orient his stones towards the top.

I have doubts about White 50. I would play 1 and 3 in *Dia. 3*, then attack with 5 and 7. If the sequence to 9 is played, White's thickness looks like working effectively.



Dia. 3: using White's thickness





Figure 2 (51-100)

Figure 2 (51-100). Profit vs. thickness

Even though White peeps at 54, Black answers at 55. He has no complaints about the result to 63, in which he gouges out the top. I think the game looks easier for Black. Kobayashi made the same comment. But he wasn't completely confident, adding: 'White's thickness is really impressive, so it might not be as good for Black as I thought.' It's an unpleasant feeling when you have a lead, yet the opponent uses his thickness to gradually whittle it down.

White 82. White A also looks possible, but the Meijin made up his mind quickly on this move.

White 86 is the natural response to 85. If instead White links up with 87, Black B links up his own groups above and below, which at one stroke makes the game easy for Black.



Dia. 4: a splitting attack

The question is how Black should rescue his group at the top. Black 89 is an incredible an-

swer. I wouldn't have the courage to play this move. I would probably choose 1 and 3 in Dia. 4. White will make a splitting attack with 4. The black groups above and below are unsettled, which is probably why Kobayashi didn't like this variation. Even so, my feeling is that Black would probably be OK.

Black uses the 91-93 combination to try to secure his groups.





Figure 3 (101-125)



Dia. 5: slightly better for White

Figure 3 (101-125). Cho misses his chance.

Well, Black is alive at the top after 5, but White 6 increases his anxieties about the bottom group. Even if there's no problem about the life of the group as a whole, Black will lose if White rips off a substantial part of it.

Cho seems to have missed his chance with 8. The players in the pressroom were agreed that

backing up with 1 in *Dia.* 5 would have been good for White. Black uses the emergency measure of 2 to save his group up to 10. White next attaches at 'a' on the top right. Our conclusion was that this gave White a slight lead.

White's mistake with 8 was probably caused by an excess of fighting spirit.

The play here is full of points I don't understand. What would happen if White used 18 to jump to A? You couldn't explain this fully no matter how many diagrams you used.

I do have the feeling that White 18 was not forceful enough. Capturing the bottom area up to 25 is the kind of *shinogi* you dream of. This seems to have given Black a small lead.




Figure 4 (126-162)

57: connects (left of 49); 59: ko (below 50)

Figure 4 (126-162). *The lead fluctuates.*

White 26, 28. Cho really likes to complicate things. However, when Black ataries at 29, White doesn't have enough ko threats, so he can't fight a ko with A. Perhaps the Meijin made a miscalculation.

Black 43 is also hard to understand. In the pressroom we believed that simply connecting at 45 would have given Black a win...

In the game also, Black is heading for a certain win. Black probably simplified by playing the atari of 47 because he had read out his win. However, capturing the ko with 59 is awful. White's breaking into black territory with 60 and 62 throws the game into confusion. Instead of 59, the most urgent point was jumping to B. This would have given Black a win by 1½ points.




Figure 5 (163-200)

69: ko (below 66); 81: connects (at 66)

Figure 5 (163-200). *White takes the lead.*

Black 65. Attaching at A may be better. White 68 is thick; making territory here means that White has upset Black's lead.




Figure 6 (201-264)

ko (over 17): 20, 23, 26, 29, 32, 35, 38, 41;
49: connects (at 16)

Figure 6 (201-264). *Cho stumbles at the end.*

Cho Meijin slips up in the endgame. Setting up a ko with 16 is the losing move. If instead he had connected at 46, he would have secured a win by half a point.

White can't win the ko fight; the one-point loss he suffers from Black 43 is fatal.

Black wins by half a point.

(Monthly Go World, January 2006)

Game Seven: Cho delivers

White: Cho U

Black: Kobayashi Satoru

Played at the Devil's Dwelling Place (Oni no sumika), Izu City, Shizuoka Prefecture on 9 & 10 November 2005.

Commentary by Cho U. Report by Akiyama Kenji.



Cho arrived in the playing room 15 minutes early, which is unusual. 'I didn't want to lose in fighting spirit. In a sense, I was also putting pressure on [my opponent],' Cho commented later (see the interview following this commentary).





Figure 1 (1-30)

Figure 1 (1-30). An unsatisfactory opening

Since it was the seventh game, we conducted the nigiri again. If anything, I'd be happier to draw black, I thought, but I got white. I braced myself mentally to get into fighting mode.



Dia. 1: problems

White's opening in this game is bad. I'm stumped: I still can't pinpoint the causes of my failure. I think I'll just tell you mainly what I thought and felt during the game.

The opening was different in each game in this series, so I really learnt a lot. Kobayashi Sensei plays the sanrensei. The sequence from 10 to 19 is one set pattern, but with 20 I enter the world of misgivings.

This peep won't be sente unless played now. But there's also a possibility of its becoming a bad move. If you start thinking about it, there's no limit.


Instead of 22, I also thought about making good use of the peep by enclosing the corner with 1 in Dia. 1. However, Black 2 is a good move. After White 3 and Black 4, the white group is left with anxieties about its eye shape, so I had no choice but to reject this variation. If Black played 2 at 3, White would jump to 2, which wouldn't be bad. This is the vital point for both sides. White 1 at 'a' is the most aggressive move, but I feel it's too thin. To illustrate, after the same moves from 2 to 4, the invasion of Black 'b' will be severe.

I hear there was a theory that letting Black make the approach move of 23 may have been the cause of my getting a difficult game. That may well be true, but it couldn't be helped.

The attachment of 24 is another move for which there's no limit if you start thinking about it. I also wanted to play the diagonal move of White A. There's no knowing what Black will get up to in the bottom left, so I preferred to be cautious, but this does represent a change of plan on my part.

My first intention was to answer Black 25 with White 1 in Dia. 2. I made a snap judgement that I could handle the fight after Black 2 by connecting at 3. However, you can't expect Black to play such a mild move as capturing the white stone in a ladder with Black 5 — he will descend at 4, putting White on the spot. Even if White

White plays 5 and 7, aiming at White 'a', Black hanes at 8 — this fight will be too much for White.



Dia. 2: Black's severe counter

For that reason, I changed course with White 26 etc. Perhaps it was the inconsistency of my play here that made the game tough for me.




Figure 2 (31-57)

Figure 2 (31-57). Problems for White

Playing Black 31 without making a hane in the corner is a good move. Kobayashi Sensei develops rapidly and plays severely. When Black switches to 35, the result is that he has had everything his own way. The game looks a little difficult for White. I'm sorry that I can't clearly identify White's bad moves despite having been granted these pages in the magazine.

At any rate, White stakes out a position at the top with 36 and 38 — it will be difficult for Black to turn all the right side into territory. I felt that, though the game was tough for me, it was still a close contest.

Black 39 is a good point. I was surprised that Black forced with 41. Kobayashi Sensei commented: 'It's not going to be a game in which


Black invades at the top.' But was it necessary to force now? There will be time later, so holding the forcing move in reserve is probably the usual strategy. Of course, another way to look at it is that the forcing move is unlikely to become a bad move. Go is difficult.

I don't know if Kobayashi Sensei believed he was ahead, but the steadiness of his play is conspicuous. Black 43 and 45 are good, steady moves. Black is seeking the momentum to turn the right side into territory.

In answer to Black 49, White seeks his own momentum with 50. The suggestion was made that White could have connected at 1 in *Dia. 3*, but letting Black extend at 2 is painful. At one stroke, Black deepens the valley of his moyo; even though White could invade at 'a', I would have no confidence if Black countered with 'b'.

The atari technique of 50 also appeared in Game Six. I believe that this atari creates added tenacity and gives White a chance to invade the right side.

The moves from 54 to 57 are what you'd expect. What White wants is Black 55 at A, letting him squeeze with B.



Dia. 3: painful for White







Figure 3 (58-87)



Dia. 4: unresolved problems

Figure 3 (58-87). Difficult decisions

There was another move I wanted to play instead of White 58: the contact play of 1 in *Dia. 4*. If Black answers with 2 and 4, White plays 5, then links up with 7, getting what is clearly an efficient result. The only thing is that it's hard to know what to do if Black pushes down with 4 at 'a'. Can White cut immediately with 'b'? Can he first play a forcing move at 'c'? I thought and thought and ended up playing cautiously. Doing what you want to do is the proper way to play, but it's not so easy in practice.


Black 61 is a natural peep. White can't connect even if it kills him.

Black played 63 immediately. This was obviously his original plan. If instead he cuts with 1 in *Dia. 5*, a fight to the death follows. If White connects at 2, Black blocks with 3 to 7. This makes things extremely awkward for White. No matter how many moves he plays, he doesn't get a good result: he's fated to be annihilated. So what should White do when Black cuts at 1? Making an atari at 8, letting Black capture at 2, is too weak-kneed — White can't hope to get a good result. In answer to Black 1, I was thinking

of something like attaching with White 17 while there were still sente moves in this area. I can't make any diagrams for the ensuing variations, but it would be frightening for both sides.

I understand why Kobayashi Sensei played cautiously with 63. Even this is good for Black. The only thing is that the impression I got when I was playing was that I had made up most of my deficit from the opening when I played the hane of 64.

Black 67, driving a wedge between the white groups above and below, looks natural, but Kataoka Satoshi Sensei had a clever suggestion: how about Black 1 and 3 in *Dia. 6*? This would be severe. The idea, with the implied threat of Black 'a', is to contrive a full-fledged splitting attack. Once again, I can't make diagrams for the continuations, but my feeling is that there's no way the fight could go badly for Black. He makes a splitting attack, but his real aim is to turn the right side into territory — it all looks grim for White.



Dia. 5: disaster Dia. 6: Kataoka's suggestion

Black 67 is a little slack, so White has the leeway to play 68 and 70. This confronts Black with a difficult decision. If he emphasizes territory with 1 in *Dia. 7*, White will exchange 2 for 3, then carve a large chunk out of the side with 4. This variation would give quite a close game.

So Black decides to stick to attack with 71. White 72 and Black 73 are now the natural momentum. When I invaded at 74, I believed that I wouldn't come under too severe an attack and that the game was not bad for me. The truth of the matter, though, is that Black was still ahead.

Black 75 is the vital point for attack. The moves from 76 are a one-way street.


Black 83 was subtly different from what I had expected. I believed that Black would make a precipitate attack on my group below, but at one stroke that would simplify the game. Black 83, though natural, is a good move: it creates the option of staking the game on territory, too.

Next, Black 85 is severe. White knows what Black is after, so he defends solidly with 86.

I hear that Kobayashi Sensei was proud of the sealed move of 87. I had considered various moves and concluded that White could do OK for all of them. The final move that remained for me to look at was Black 87. Eh? Is the game, after all, bad for White? That's what I had to think.

Sure enough, Black played 87. Great care is called for in answering it. If White plays 1 in *Dia. 8*, Black plays 2, then peeps at 4. Next, he steals the eyes of the bottom group with 6; most likely, it will die.

I was lucky that I saw 87 coming and was able to find a counter in advance. If it had come out of the blue, I might have panicked and lost. Even so, White faces a crisis. He's going to have to work hard to cope with it.



Dia. 7: White is satisfied Dia. 8: trouble

Figure 4 (88–103). The losing move

Connecting at 88, making sure Black doesn't get a peep, is the only move.

Black 89 is sente against the bottom group. White 90 doesn't make definite eye shape, but one wants to go all out like this, taking aim at Black's own thinness.

Black 91 and 93 are natural, but Black 95 may be a little slack. Perhaps Kobayashi Sensei believed that White would answer 95 immedi-

ately at 102. However, White will obviously secure his eye shape with 96 etc. There may be a cutting point at A, but at present the right side is bigger. The only thing is that I don't know how Black should have played with 95.





Figure 4 (88–103)



Dia. 9: best for 103

My preceding comments don't mean that I'm saying that White has taken the lead. Around 101, Black could have forced with B, making White secure his eyes. Perhaps, in view of his original momentum, Black thought that this would be wasteful.

Black 103 is the losing move. Black probably thought this was sente. In the game review, we concluded that Black 1 in *Dia. 9* was the correct move. Black would probably have been dissatisfied to see so little result from the attack launched in the previous figure, but I feel that this is par for the course. White switches to 2 and 4, Black cuts at 5, and Black looks like winning by a little. Instead of 2, making the forcing exchange of White 'a'–Black 'b' feels a little wasteful. After Black 5, there's an element of uncertainty, as I don't know what happens if Black attaches at C at the top in the figure, so I can't count the score.





Figure 5 (104-140)



Dia. 10: good for White Dia. 11: satisfactory

Figure 5 (104-140). No regrets about the placement

Black 103 in Figure 4 entailed a loss of about half a move. White 4 to 8 became sente, which must have given Black a jolt. I believed that at this point I had upset Black's lead.

Black 11, ignoring White 10, is an all-out do-or-die move. Instead of 12, the strong counter of blocking at 15 is not impossible, but an attempt by Black to capture the whole group with A will be frightening. At this point, White is playing cautiously. However, winning comfortably is out of the question; the border between playing solidly and playing safely is difficult to ascertain.

People made various comments to me about the placement of White 26. It's true that I also have a feeling I didn't have to go this far. If instead I attached at B, followed by Black C and White D, I would win by around a point and a half. The only thing is that you can't call this a safe lead: some small incident would overturn it.

When you're actually playing, you naturally want to play at 26.

It's a difficult question how Black should play with 27 or 29. If Black is kind enough to attach at 1 in *Dia. 10*, White links up with 2 to 8. White's profit may not be spectacular, but you can now make definite calculations.

If Black played at 1 in *Dia. 11*, I intended to attach at 2. If Black stops White from linking up with 3, White forces with 4, then captures with 6. Here, too, one can work out the figures.

Preventing the connection with Black 29 is a do-or-die move that aims at making it impossible for White to come up with the figures. However, the counter of White 30 works well; this group can't be captured.





Figure 6 (141-176)

47: ko (right of 42)



Dia. 12: White wins

Figure 6 (141-176). Clinching the game

White increases his profit by cutting at 46. He moves towards victory step by step.

Black 49. I hear that the players in the press-room investigated the cut of 1 in *Dia. 12* as an alternative to this move. The idea is to keep the atari in reserve for the anticipated ko fight. The

moves to 11 are inevitable; next, I planned to atari at 12. After 13, White captures with 14 and 16, and unconditional life for Black is inconceivable; he doesn't get centre territory, either, so this is clearly a win for White.

At the end, I made no mistake in clinching the game with 62 and 66. If White hastens to capture, with 62 at 67, Black extends at A, and White will get his hands burnt.

I breathed a sigh of relief when the game ended.

Black resigns after White 176.



The morning after . . .

Recent Meijin results

This list updates the one in *The Go Player's Almanac 2001*.

26th (2001). Yoda Norimoto 9-dan d. Rin Kaiho 9-dan 4-2.

27th (2002). Yoda d. Cho Chikun 9-dan 4-1.

28th (2003). (Komi changed to 6½.) Yoda d. Yamashita Keigo 9-dan 4-1.

29th (2004). Cho U 9-dan d. Yoda 4-2.

30th (2005). Cho d. Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan 4-3.

Interview by Akiyama Kenji

AK: Let's get to the nitty-gritty. How did you feel when you won three games in a row?

Cho: Kobayashi Sensei's play surprised me. His play when he was behind didn't feel forceful.

Usually he puts a lot of pressure on you. I felt that I might be able to wind up the match smoothly.

AK: But things didn't run smooth. When he started his comeback, almost all go fans were rooting for him.

Cho: That can't be helped. If I were a spectator, I'd want the match to go the full distance, too. The only thing is that it was a little painful for me when one of the dignitaries at the party the night before the fourth game said in his speech that he wanted to see a seventh game.

AK: That was certainly insensitive. You'd expect a little more consideration for the feelings of the player. . . . How did you feel when the series went to the seventh game?

Cho: It felt special. This is not an experience that you will have so often in your life. Whether you win or lose, it will stay in your memory, and the game record will remain, too.

AK: You came to the playing room early on the first morning — 15 minutes is very early.

Cho: It's easier on you to stay in your room until the last minute. Being filmed for TV also makes me uncomfortable. But I felt that I had to demonstrate fighting spirit.

AK: You looked very stern.

Cho: That's not necessarily a good thing — if your desire to win is too strong. You can't win just because you want to. I thought I would be left with regrets if I didn't play my hardest.

AK: I was impressed when you said in the interview after the final game that your three successive wins were due to luck and your three successive losses showed your real strength.

Cho: There are not many cases where you win a game because you played well. In almost all cases, you are saved by your opponent's mistakes. So I make it a rule to ascribe wins to good luck and losses to my mistakes. In the final game, I was lucky.

AK: To change the subject, what kind of a year was 2005 for you?

Cho: It began well when I won the LG Cup, but then it started going downhill with the Honinbo title match. The Kisei League looked good for me when I started with two wins, but then I lost to Yuki and lost my motivation. However, I didn't expect to drop out of the league. That was my first demotion from a league. If on top of that I had lost the Meijin title, it would have been a painful year.

(*Monthly Go World*, January 2006. Meijin report translated by John Power.)

The 10th Samsung Cup Final, Game Three

White: Yi Ch'ang-ho 9-dan (Korea)

Black: Luo Xihe 9-dan (China)

Komi: 6½; time: 2 hours each

Played in Seoul on 13 January 2006.

Commentary by Komatsu Hideki 9-dan. Report by Ise Eisuke.

Luo Xihe of China scored the biggest triumph of his career when he defeated Yi Ch'ang-ho of Korea in the final of this tournament. It was actually the first time that Yi had lost the final of a world championship to a non-Korean player. [This was his 20th final — his loss made his record 17–3, which is pretty astonishing; however, if you count his TV Asia Cup results, which is 3–3 in finals, including losses to Takemiya and Yoda, his total becomes 20–6 — still one unlikely to be bettered for some time.]


Faced with the world's number one, Luo rose to the occasion. His play in the final game was highly praised by our commentator.

Komatsu: 'This game is a ko masterpiece. Luo's all-out play, refusing to give an inch, was magnificent.'

His strategy is to nullify White's thickness.

White 44 is surprising. Komatsu: 'If Yi felt he wanted to play this move, then questioning whether it's good or bad is beside the point. The only thing is that the result on the left side is slack for White. Drawing back at 1 in *Dia. 1* would probably have been better for 46. In the first place, capping at 'a' instead of playing the marked stone would be the usual strategy, but perhaps White lacked confidence when Black continued by attaching at 'b'.'

Black 47 is a good move — Black has no trouble settling his group.



Dia. 1: better for 46




Figure 1 (1–50)

Figure 1 (1–50). Luo makes a good start.

The fuseki to 11 is the same as the opening game, which Luo won. Yi makes the first change with 12. Black takes profit in the top and bottom left corners, on top of which he invades at 39.




Figure 2 (51–100)

Figure 2 (51–100). Black takes the lead.

Black pokes his head out with 55 to 61, so White must answer the ladder-breaker of 63 by capturing with 64, which is painful [he would

prefer to be able to swallow up this stone without removing it from the board]. The successive moves of 63 and 67 give Black a good position.

The focus of the game now shifts to the fighting on the right side. Black puts pressure on White with 75 and 77. Komatsu: 'Instead of 75, extending to Black 78 would be the usual move. In the game, Black captures two white stones, but he loses territory.'





Figure 3 (101-150)
28: connects



Dia. 2: trouble for Black

Figure 3 (101-150). Yi goes all out.

Komatsu: 'When Black switches to 1 here, he may still have the lead, but White presses him hard with 8. You have to give Yi credit: he doesn't let you win easily.'

Black 9. If omitted, White 1 and 3 in Dia. 2 will make Black unhappy.

White expands his centre territory with 10 and 12, then counters the reducing move of 13 with 14. Both sides go all out in the fight here.

Black 29 is the strongest move: Black doesn't flinch. White takes profit at the top up to 40, but Black can be satisfied with linking up with 39 and 41.





Figure 4 (151-200)
ko (over 57): 60, 63, 66; 78: ko (at 74); 79: ko (at 57); 80: ko (at 72); 82: ko (at 70);
ko (over 69): 85, 88, 91, 96, 99



Dia. 3: White's sente moves

Figure 4 (151-200). Undaunted by the kos

The ko fight that is the highlight of the game starts in this figure. White uses the cut of 54 to stir up trouble in the top right corner.

Black 79. If Black connects at 1 in Dia. 3, White will be captured, but White can play 2 and 4 in sente; White 'a' will also be sente, forcing Black 'b'. When Black uses 1 to capture at 'c' and 'd', as in the game, White still gets a ko in the corner, but Black gets ko threats against the right-side white group.

Komatsu: 'Luo is a fast player, but this was a two-hour game, so it's unlikely he could have had enough time left to read out the continuation to the end. He was within sight of his first international victory; Black 1 in the diagram would be safe and the game wouldn't be bad for him. In such a situation, I think his intuitive feeling that he could handle the ko fight was magnificent.'

Figure 5 (201-250), Figure 6 (251-303)

The ko drags on endlessly. Komatsu commented that fighting a ko to the bitter end like

this was unusual and the reason why this game was so interesting.

To win the ko fight, White is playing ko threats regardless of the cost. Even so, White 72 and 78 in Figure 6 cause him large losses.

With things having come this far, reducing White's territory with the successive moves of 81 and 83 at the top is good enough for Black.




Figure 5 (201–250)

ko (over 2): 5, 8, 11, 14, 17, 20, 23, 26, 29, 32, 35, 38, 41, 44, 47, 50




Figure 6 (251–303)

ko (over 53): 56, 59, 62; 64: takes three stones;
ko (over 53): 65, 68; 69: throws in (at 63);
70: captures (above 63); ko (over 53): 71, 74,
77, 80; 86: connects (right of 82);
96: connects (at 93)

The game continues to move 360, but the issue has already been decided.

Moves 304 to 360 omitted. Black wins by 5½ points.

(Go Weekly, 30 January 2006. Translated by John Power.)

The 7th Japan–China Agon Kiriya Cup Play-off

White: Gu Li 7-dan (China)

Black: Iyama Yuta 7-dan (Japan)

Komi: 7½ (Chinese rules); time: 10 seconds per move plus ten minutes.

Played on Hainan Island on 10 January 2006.

Report by Yamamura Hideki.


This was Iyama Yuta's debut on the international stage. Although he had set a new record in Japan by winning the Agon Kiriya Cup at the age of 16, it seems that the 22-year-old Gu Li, who has been China's number one for a couple of years, did not yet recognize him as a serious rival. In a press interview, he referred to the fact that Iyama has won only one game out of six in matches at the Chinese Ki-in with young Chinese players [the occasion was a tour of China by the place-getters in the privately-sponsored Nakano Cup, a tournament for young players in Japan].

He also referred to the expectations of Chinese fans that he would help China overtake Japan in this tournament (Japan had won four of the six play-offs).


For his part, Iyama commented that he was happy to have the chance to play Gu Li, whose games records had impressed him with his strength.

The Japan–China Agon Kiriya Play-off

- 1st (2000). Kobayashi Koichi (Japan) d. Ma Xiaochun.
- 2nd (2000). Cho Sonjin (Japan) d. Zhou Heyang.
- 3rd (2001). Cho Sonjin d. Liu Jing.
- 4th (2002). Cho Chikun (Japan) d. Yu Bin.
- 5th (2003). Gu Li (China) d. Kato Masao.
- 6th (2004). Zhou Heyang (China) d. Hane Naoki.
- 7th (2006). Gu Li d. Iyama Yuta.



Dia. (1-50)



Dia. 1: sacrifice strategy

Figure 1 (1-50). *Gu makes the better start.*

White 10 is a special strategy. Gu said later that he expected Iyama to counter with Black A, which is the strongest move, but he kept things simple by switching to 11. Iyama did consider playing 11 at 16. 'Perhaps, after all, I should have played something in the top right,' said Iyama.

Linking up with 24 and 26 works well for White and leaves Black dissatisfied, as his four stones on the outside are floating. Iyama: 'This was a little painful.'

Actually, instead of 23, Iyama had considered more or less sacrificing his corner stones with 1 to 5 in *Dia. 1*, but when it came to the point he lacked the courage.

Black 33 should be a high move at B or C, according to Iyama. That would create a ladder-block for the ladder after Black pushes through at D and cuts, so Black could aim at this attack later. Iyama hallucinated that 33 was also a ladder block.

Figure 2 (51-100). *Over-aggressive*

Black 51. 'Perhaps this was too persistent,'

said Iyama. 'I should have enclosed territory with Black A and aimed at Black B.'

White 54 is an ideal shoulder hit. Also, Black can't omit 57 after White 56.

Iyama thought that his best chance of winning was to go all out in attacking the bottom white group, but he tried too hard. Countering White 66 with Black 67 is the losing move. When White cuts at 68 and forces with 72 and 74, Black's attack ceases to be a threat.




Figure 2 (51-100)

Iyama: 'If I had played Black 69-White 70-Black C instead of 67, the game would still have been a contest.'

Far from being attacked, the white group is now strong, so White can let fly with the forceful cut of 80. Actually, this worried the Chinese players in the pressroom, who thought that it was overdoing things.

Black 95. Black could save his stones with Black 96, but 'there's no way for Black to win' (Iyama) if White connects at 95. Black prefers to sacrifice the stones and stake the game on his invasion at 1 in Figure 3.



Iyama makes a painful international debut.





Figure 3 (101-135)



Dia. 2: an improvement on 29

Figure 3 (101-135). Gu parries the attack.

Despite his loss on the left side, Iyama thought that the game was still undecided. Gu was holding his head and seemed to be agonizing over his play, but his actual moves were calm and collected. He made eye shape for his group at the top with 2 on and let Black attack his group at the bottom.

Iyama: 'Black 29 was the worst move. Any

other move would have been an improvement.'

Black steals the eye shape of the group with 17 and 19, but White makes shape that's hard to attack with 24 and 26. For example, Black 1 in *Dia. 2* would have had more effect on the white group above. However, research by the players in the game review showed that it would not have led to an upset.

Figure 4 (136-172). Unable to rise to the occasion

When White lives large with 40, then links up with 50, the issue has been decided.

Iyama: 'My opponent was too strong, but my play was also awful. I made too many mistakes, so it's only natural that I lost. However, I learnt a lot from playing a game as a representative of my country.'

Black resigns after White 172.

(Go Weekly, 23 January 2006. Translated by John Power.)




Figure 4 (136-172)

The 4th Cheongkwangjang Cup

In this report, we present the final two games from this tournament.

Game 12: Pak vs. Koyama

White: Koyama Terumi 5-dan (Japan)

Black: Pak Chi-eun 6-dan (Korea)

Komi: 6½; time: 3 hours each

Played in Shanghai on 17 January 2006.

Commentary by Omori Yasushi 8-dan.

Figure 1 (1-50). A surprising counter

On seeing Black 31, Omori muttered: 'That's an incredible move.' The usual answer is shown in *Dia. 1*. Putting aside the question of whether it's good or bad, Black 31 wouldn't occur to a Japanese professional.

Koyama counters by sacrificing two stones. White makes excellent shape up to 38. When Black cuts at 45, White goes for centre thickness with 46 and 48, giving up the stones on the side.





Figure 1 (1-50)



Dia. 1: par for the course





Figure 2 (51-100)

Figure 2 (51-100). A move without substance

Up to 51, Black has taken profit and settled both her groups while White has built thickness.

Up to 87, the game seems well balanced in territory, but White falls behind with 88, a move that lacks substance.

Omori: 'Instead of 88, pushing up with 1 in Dia. 2 would be big. If Black 2, White forces with 3, then descends at 5. This sets up a connection with 'a', so she doesn't have to worry about her top group. In the game, Black plays 95 in sente, so White has fallen about ten points behind.'



Dia. 2: an even game




Figure 3 (101-155)

Figure 3 (101-155). An upset?

The sente capture of 21 confirms Black's lead. However, Black 23 is a move that could have lost the game. White strikes at 24, accurately exploiting Black's slip. Up to 35, Black's shape becomes very shaky and her potential centre territory disappears. Suddenly, the game feels like an upset.

White can make a good contest of it either by going for territory or by harassing the bottom right black group. The problem is that Koyama seems to have dithered about which way to go.




Figure 4 (156-200)
85: connects

Figure 4 (156-200). The decisive mistake

Black 57 is the vital point for securing eye shape while taking profit. Omori: 'If instead of 56 White had captured two stones with A-Black B-White 57, the game would have been a definite win for White.'

Koyama was perhaps shaken by her mistake — after this she falls behind bit by bit and loses the game by a surprisingly large margin.

Moves after 200 omitted.

Black wins by $4\frac{1}{2}$ points.



Pak Chi-eun

Game 13: Pak vs. Ye

White: Pak Chi-eun 6-dan (Korea)

Black: Ye Gui 5-dan (China)

Played in Shanghai on 18 January 2006.

Commentary by Omori Yasushi 8-dan.




Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 1 (1-50). Black's moyo strategy

Black stakes the game on her moyo.




Figure 2 (51-100)

Figure 2 (51-100). Black slips up.

Black 53 is a sharp counterattack. In a flash, Black builds a strong position here.

White feels she is behind, so she plunges in deep with 64. Attacking this stone directly is surprisingly difficult, so Black goes for profit with 73 and 77 to 81.

Black 83 and 85 are big moves, as they set up the cut of A, but at this point they are dubious. White probably upsets Black's lead when she swallows up two stones with 94.

Figure 3 (101-155). Pak's slack move

White 6 is a sign of optimism. Omori: 'Pak

presumably thought that it would be difficult for Black to secure the centre, but she blocks it off neatly up to 19, which suddenly makes the game very close.' Instead of 6, White should have moved into the centre with 1 in *Dia. 1*.





Figure 3 (101-155)

Figure 4 (156-216). A close endgame

A very tight endgame contest results in a narrow win for Ye. Pak had done very well to beat Rui Naiwei in Game 11, but the Chinese team had strength in depth.

Black wins by $\frac{1}{2}$ point.

(Go Weekly, 6 February 2006. Translated by John Power.)



Dia. 1: better for White




Figure 4 (156-216)
104: connects (at 101)

Mastering the Basics, Volume Three

Making Good Shape


by Rob van Zeijst and Richard Bozulich

One of the most difficult subjects to master is good shape: how to make it, how to use it. Yet an understanding of shape is essential for becoming a stronger player — without a proper grounding in the techniques of making good shape, you will always be at a disadvantage when the fighting starts.

This book is a thorough introduction to the subject of shape. The first chapter gives a comprehensive theoretical introduction to the criteria for good shape, focusing in particular on the topics of thickness, heavy and light stones and *sabaki*. The second chapter is a survey of standard shapes, both good and bad, and the third provides 245 problems for the reader to practice using the concepts and techniques explained in the first two chapters. The book concludes with two example games.

Second edition (with corrections) now available. Price: US\$15.00 + shipping.

The 30th Kisei Title Match: Hane Naoki vs. Yamashita Keigo



The defending champion

Going into this title match, Hane Naoki was considered the slight favourite by many onlookers, despite the fact that he had a dismal record against the challenger, Yamashita Keigo, of nine wins to 18 losses. There were two main reasons: firstly, Hane had, after all, defeated Yamashita in their first clash in a Kisei title match, when he was the challenger. On that occasion, he had started with three straight wins, but things got complicated when Yamashita turned the tide with a dramatic half-point win in the fourth game. He went on to even the score at 3–3. Five times previously a player had recovered from a 0–3 deficit to reach 3–3 in a best-of-seven and each time he had gone on to win the match. However, Hane became the first player to stem the tide when he defeated Yamashita in the seventh game.

The second reason why Hane's chances were favoured was that Yamashita Keigo had gone into a slump in the second half of 2005, losing two title matches in a row at the end of the year.

However, a best-of-seven is always a new start, and often past results become irrelevant. Nonetheless, for the curious, the relevant background data are summarized in the next column.

Yamashita vs. Hane

- Results to end of 05: Yamashita led 18–9. He came to the Kisei match with a five-game winning streak.
- Title matches: Hane won 28th Kisei (2004) and 29th Tengen (2003); Yamashita won 24th (1999) and 25th (2000) King of the New Stars and 30th Tengen (2004).

2005 results

Hane Naoki

- 29–19 (compared to 19–26 in 2004).
- 7–6 in international tournaments (a big improvement on 0–10 in 2004).
- Defended Kisei title 4–3 vs. Yuki Satoshi.
- Entered Honinbo League (61st) for first time (but has not played in the Meijin league for four years).
- Recent style: emphasizes balance, prefers to make a leisurely opening and build up strength before starting fighting, but is concerned to match the opponent in fighting spirit; is noted for his calmness in adversity.
- Career record: 598 wins, 249 losses, 1 no-contest = 70.6%.

Yamashita Keigo

- 33–20 (39–32 in 2004).
- 4–4 in international tournaments (4–8 in 2004).
- Lost 30th Meijin League play-off.
- Challenged unsuccessfully for Oza title.
- Lost Tengen title 2–3 to Kono Rin.
- Recent style: continues to favour thickness and fighting, but focusses more than before on the territorial balance and is more patient. Some pundits believe his style is unsettled at present because he has lost confidence in his strongly thickness/influence-oriented style.
- Career record: 567–200–1 jigo = 73.9%.

If anything, one could say that this title match was more important for Yamashita, in view of his recent setbacks, but Hane would not agree, of course — no one wants to give up the number one title. If he were to win his third Kisei title, he would pull level with O Rissei and be behind only Fujisawa Shuko, Cho Chikun, and Kobayashi Koichi in the history of this tournament.

Kisei Title

First prize: ¥42,000,000 (about \$362,000 at \$1=¥116)

Game One Success for a do-or-die move

White: Hane Naoki Kisei

Black: Yamashita Keigo 9-dan

Komi: 6½; time: 8 hours each

Played at the Intercontinental Hotel, Berlin on 15 & 16 January 2006.

Commentary by Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan. Report by Yamada Hiroyuki.




Figure 1 (1-33)

Figure 1 (1-33). *The problem of the ladder*

White 6 is actually a little unusual in this fuseki. Attaching at A is the most common move.

White 18. White doesn't choose the peaceful move of 27, so the game launches on the fighting variation of this joseki. White 21 next would make good shape, so cutting at 19 is natural. The cutting stones, which are increased to five, are a sacrifice; they seem big, but Black gets forcing moves at B and C and can play a ladder breaker at 33.

Figure 2 (34-61). *Hane's patience*

Yamashita was probably astonished when White eliminated the ladder with 38: the shape in the bottom right is one in which you'd think it would be difficult to tenuki. White also ignores 39, making a ponnuki with 40. This eliminates all the disagreeable aji in this area and makes it possible for White to fight strongly at the bottom and on the right. As far as the bottom right corner is concerned, one would have expected White to play 40 at 1 in *Dia. 1*. This gives Black

the chance to connect at 4. If 5 to 11 follow, Black expands his moyo and gets an excellent result.





Figure 2 (34-61)



Dia. 1: Black is satisfied

Black forces White into a cramped position with 41 to 45, but the influence of White's ponnuki is undiminished. Kobayashi: 'The tenuki shows how patient Hane is. The game seems slightly easier for White than for Black.' At this stage, Hane seemed full of confidence.

Black 59. After this, the question of the ladder becomes the focus of the game. If White can escape with 52, he might get a big territory on the left side.

White 60 is a ladder-breaker, but, if Black captures at A, White will attach at B; if White settles his group easily, Black will fall behind. That's why he goes all out with 61.





Figure 3 (62-100)

Figure 3 (62-100). Ladders, ladders

White ignores the marked stone and makes a narrow extension to 62 at the bottom. This is a solid move that aims at harassing the black group to the right, but no one in the pressroom saw White 64 coming. The ladder may favour White, but even so starting a fight in an area where Black is so strong is surprising. According to Kobayashi Satoru, playing at the top, which would involve the ladder in the bottom left, is most urgent. As one possibility, he showed White 1 in *Dia. 2*. If Black answers with 2 and 4, White 5 makes miai of 'a' and pulling his stone out of the ladder with A in the figure. Another possibility for 64 is the flexible move of B.



Dia. 2: better for White?


White 64 is an example of the added aggressiveness seen in Hane's play recently, but White's corner group is alive, which means that Black's three stones [41, 43, and 45 in Figure 2] are not pivotal stones.

White 66. If at 69, Black sets up a geta with C.

Black 71. Capturing the white stone here would make up for the loss if White continued after 70 by capturing the three black stones.

Black 73, the sealed move, is a little surpris-


ing, as these three stones don't seem to be important. However, Kobayashi Koichi 9-dan, the referee, commented: 'Black is well aware that it will be hard for these three stones to work efficiently even if he saves them, but presumably he has concluded that this gives him the best chance of winning.' He had expected Black 1 in *Dia. 3*.



Dia. 3: the vital point

Dia. 3. Black 1 is the vital point. After 2 to 5, Black would aim at attacking the weak white group at the bottom and wait for a chance to finish off the ladder on the left.


At the public commentary held at the hotel while the game was still in progress, a member of the audience asked if there was a ladder when Black used 89 to cut at 1 in *Dia. 4*. The answer from Kobayashi Koichi and Kobayashi Satoru was that there was, and they wondered why Yamashita didn't play it. Upon being queried after the game, the players answered in unison: 'It's bad for Black.' The two Kobayashis had overlooked the role played by the marked white stone.



Dia. 4: a ladder


Dia. 5. This is an unusual sight: three ladders moving in tandem through the centre of the

board. However, White is the one who actually captures. Black will get a big centre, but White should be able to settle his stone in the top right, so this is reasonable for him.



Dia. 5: three ladders

At this point of the game, Black's main worry is the ladder in the bottom left. If White were able to pull out his stone, it's unlikely Black would be able to win even if he secured all the top area. Therefore, it should be easy for White to settle himself at the top by using a ladder block.



Dia. 6: too easy for White 9: connects

Black 95. The usual move is 1 in *Dia. 6*, but that makes it too easy for White to settle his group. White forces twice, then attaches at 6, as in the game.

Black 95, 97. Black knows he can't stop White from settling himself, so in the meantime he tries to increase his territory. Yamashita is the one who is playing patiently now.

The players in the pressroom were speculating that Black would have a hard time giving the komi, but actually the game was closer than they thought.

Figure 4 (101-123). *A good move is trumped by a brilliancy.*

Black 3 is a clever move. Inducing White 4

lets Black connect at 5, so now he can put pressure on the corner with 7 to 11. Living is not difficult for White, but he has to be very careful not to lose points. This was Yamashita's first step on the path to eventual victory.





Figure 4 (101-123)



Dia. 7: Black's aim

Dia. 8: dead

Black 13 is a do-or-die move: it aims at a double attack on the white group here and the one at the top. Capturing the stone in the ladder with A is the proper move, but Yamashita presumably concluded this gave him no chance of winning.


Black 15 aims at splitting White into two with 1 to 5 in *Dia. 7*; one part of the group looks like being captured. White 18 is a good move that forestalls this.

Black counters with the probe of 19: this is another do-or-die move. Because White doesn't answer 21 in the corner, White's group there can be killed. According to Kobayashi, White should have calmly played 22 at B. Note that making the atari at 1 in *Dia. 8* doesn't help; if Black gets a chance to crawl at 2, the group dies. Without the marked stone, White could link up with 'a'.

White 22 is a good move: it aims at pulling out the stone in the ladder, attacking in the centre, and defending the bottom left group. How-

ever, it is surpassed by the brilliancy of Black 23. This move forestalls escaping from the ladder, offers support to the bottom right black group, and threatens to capture the bottom left white group. Kobayashi: 'If Black played anywhere else, he would lose.' The game has now been plunged into confusion.

Instead of 22, White should have attacked the bottom right group with 1 in *Dia. 9*. Black has no choice but to capture the bottom left group with 4 — just making life for his bottom right group would lose. If White escapes from the ladder with 11, he will win the capturing race in the bottom left.



Dia. 9: better for 22





Figure 5 (124-150) 42: connects



Dia. 10: White keeps the lead

Figure 5 (124-150). A confused fight

Hane muttered: 'Ah, I'm going to make a mess of things,' then cut violently at 28. According to Kobayashi, White would still have been ahead if he had played the solid endgame of 1 etc. in *Dia. 10*. However, he had lost points from the 22-23 exchange, and he probably felt that he couldn't win without fighting.

Splitting Black with White 30 starts a confused hand-to-hand fight in the centre. There's a sniff of an upset.

The moves to 43 are a one-way street.




Figure 6 (151-179)

Figure 6 (151-179). Anticlimax

While the players are grappling in the centre, White throws in the stylish cut of 58. This guarantees the atari of 60, increasing the liberties of the bottom left white group. In short, White 60 is a major forcing move. Black next must make life with 63.

Hane now attacks the bottom black group with 64. Locally, this is a good move, but it will become a bad move if Black captures the marked stone, so connecting at 68 is essential.

Kobayashi: 'Black is ahead, but the margin is minute. The position is very difficult: there are so many potential pitfalls in one's reading that each professional would have a different opinion.'

With a difficult endgame looming, the game suddenly came to a premature end: Black 79 killed the corner group.

Becoming aware of his oversight, Hane scratched his head, then before long resigned.

After 79, White can't live with 1 in *Dia. 11*. Kobayashi: 'Usually crawling at 79 would be

bad style, with a possibility of becoming a bad move, so that's probably why it was missing from the lines that Hane analysed.'


If White had forced with 1, then played at 3 in *Dia. 12* instead of 78, White 'a' would become sente, so he would have been alive. The game would still have been undecided.

Yamashita won this game because he didn't give up. He concentrated as hard on his opponent's moves as on his own, leaning over the go board and analysing furiously. This win probably played a big role in pulling him up out of his slump.

Of course, Hane would have been left with many regrets. This game was his for the taking, but he failed to maintain his concentration at the right level long enough.

White resigns after Black 179.

(Adapted from *The Yomiuri Newspaper*)



Game Two

Yamashita's moyo strategy bears fruit

White: Yamashita Keigo

Black: Hane Naoki

Played at the Suimeikan Inn, Gero Hot Spring, Gifu Prefecture on 1 & 2 February 2006.

Based on a brief commentary by Kobayashi Koichi 9-dan (his comments are prefaced by 'KK'), amplified through reference to the Yomiuri commentary.

Figure 1 (1–42). Overemphasizing profit

At the reception held the night before the game, Yamashita commented: 'In the first game, I was able to play patiently when the position was tough for me. From now on, I hope to show you games with good content.'

White 6–10. Investing three moves here shows that Yamashita is aiming at a leisurely game.




Figure 1 (1–42)

White 12. Yamashita prefers this move to the sanrensei.

White 22. If at 27 or 40, Black A would be big and would make setting 13 into motion a threat.

Black 25. Hane thought for 30 minutes before making the simple connection, as opposed to Black B–White C–Black 25. The players in the pressroom — Nakano Hironari 9-dan, the Yomiuri commentator, Yamashiro Hiroshi 9-dan, the referee, and Takemiya Masaki 9-dan, the satellite-TV commentator — disagreed with 26. 'Isn't connecting at B the proper move?' Takemiya asked.


When Black plays 27, White 28 is essential to forestall Black D, which would nicely expand the top moyo.

Black 33 is patient: Black doesn't want to give White any help with settling his group.

(KK) Go all out for profit, then plunge into White's moyo and lay it to waste: this seemed to be Hane's policy. Even so, the 3–3 invasion of Black 35 goes overboard for profit and is the biggest reason why Black gets a tough game.

(KK) Why I say this is that, in response to the attachment of White 40, Black would like to block at E, but his position would be in tatters when White crosscut at 42.

(KK) In short, Black is at a loss to find a move. Therefore, instead of 35, he should have made the diagonal move of 1 in *Dia. 1* (next page). White will probably answer at 2, so Black could then exchange 3 for 4 at the bottom; next, he could invade at 5 or jump one more time to 'a'. This would make the position even.



Dia. 1: a better strategy for 35





Figure 2 (43-85)




Dia. 2: good for Black

Figure 2 (43-85). Good judgement backed up by a good move

(KK) Note that if White used the marked stone [42] to prevent the connection with 1 in *Dia. 2*, Black would live in sente up to 14, then beat White to the punch at the bottom by switching to Black 48.

White 54. Pushing along at 64 instead would be a mistake: Black can make a severe counterat-

tack, starting with the hane of 2 in *Dia. 3*. If White blocks, Black sets up the tombstone squeeze with 4 on. After 22, the black group looks unlikely to die.



*Dia. 3: a disaster for White
12: at 2; 13: at 8; 15: at 2*

(KK) White 56 in answer to Black 55 is a strong move, typical of Yamashita, but in this case he is exerting himself unnecessarily. The reason is that when Black stakes out a position in the centre with 57 to 59, the left-side moyo has been reduced, and the game has become a difficult one for White. Consequently, White should have played the knight's move of A instead of 56; enclosing the left side on this scale would be good enough. I can't see any reason for White to avoid this simple variation.

Black 67 was the sealed move. (KK) Jumping out with this move is a mistake; Black fails to seize the momentum that has started to flow in his favour. Cutting between the black positions with 68 and 70 shows good judgement; the exchange of these two moves for 67 and 69 is clearly favourable for White. A further sin of 67 is that it induces the good move of White 72. Black can hardly permit White to hane at B, so Black 73 and 75 are necessary, but White forces with 76 to 80, then pushes up and cuts with 82 and 84 — White has once again taken the lead.

(KK) Consequently, instead of 67, Black should have focussed on the centre by jumping to C; this might leave White still a little ahead, but Black would also have plenty of chances of winning.

Figure 3 (86-110). White welcomes the fight.

(KK) However, playing White 86 at 94 would have been more solid. The clamp of Black 87 is a do-or-die move that aims at setting up the ko to 93. [The submissive move of 92 at 93 would be too painful for White.] This is sharp play by Hane. In exchange for the ko, Black gets

successive moves at 95 and 97. He now has hopes of staging an upset, depending on how his attempt to reduce the left side works out.

(KK) The only thing is that Yamashita had probably calculated that he could handle a fight on the left side. His profit from resolving the ko with 96 and turning the black stones here into *mochikomi* (a loss without compensation) is not small. It can be surmised that he was confident in his prospects in the attack launched by 98 and 100.





Figure 3 (86-110)

96: connects (at 93); 107: ko (at 95);
110: ko (at 102)




Dia. 4: White keeps the lead
8: connects

(KK) The fighting that follows on the left side is spectacular, but, to state the conclusion first, Black doesn't get a chance to pull off an upset.

(KK) I would like to touch on just two points. First, even if Black uses 101 to play 1 and 3 in Dia. 4, taking aim at the bottom white group, White counters with 4 to 8; Black can't let White

cut at 'a', so the diagonal connection of 9 is the only move, but White then settles his group and takes territory with 10 to 14. Black may have broken through on the left side, but, what with the loss he suffered on the right side, White's lead is unchanged.



Dia. 5: simpler for White
16: ko (at 12); 18: takes five stones

(KK) The second point comes up with White 6. I think that connecting at 1 in Dia. 5 would have been simpler. Black has no choice but to block at 2; the continuation to 16 is a one-way street and results in a ko. However, White has any number of ko threats in the neighbourhood of 17. There's no end if Black answers 17, so he ends the ko with 18, but White secures a large profit by ripping off the centre stones. This would have decided the game more quickly. A ko also follows in the game, but the compensation White takes for the ko with 14 and 18 is inferior to that in the diagram.

(KK) Even so, this game was a convincing win for Yamashita. The content of his play in his successive title defeats last year was bad, so I was worried about him before this series began, but if he plays like this you can say he's regained form.



Yamashita goes two up.




Figure 4 (111–155)

Figures 4, 5, 6. A good game for Yamashita

(KK) This was an uncharacteristic loss for Hane, but he's resilient and quickly puts his losses behind him, so I'm sure he'll recover.

The players' comments after the game were brief.

Hane: 'The centre moyo was too big.'

Yamashita: 'I played the moves I wanted to play.'

White wins by 6½ points.

(Monthly Go World, March 2006 and The Yomiuri Newspaper. Kisei report translated by John Power.)




Figure 5 (156–200)

71: ko (above 58); 96: connects (left of 62)




Figure 6 (201–244)

25: ko (below 22); 31: connects (above 13);
42: ko (at 22); 44: connects (below 22)



Nothing is going right for Hane.


Games Three and Four will be given in Go World 108.

Tesujis for a Brighter Future (4)

4. The three faces of the pressing move


In this instalment, we look at the pressing move, which, depending on its aim, has three faces. It is the magician of the go board.

One kind of pressing move applies pressure from above, another is a sacrifice, and the third is a hunter seeking prey.




The diagram above shows a typical pressing move. Black 1 captures the two white stones in a geta.

Pattern A



Black 1 applies pressure from above. This kind of pressing move appears frequently in actual play. It forces White into a low position and builds up strength/influence that may help Black in the area above.


Pattern B




Black 1 is a sacrifice tesuji. Instead —

Ref. Dia. 1. If Black tries to save his two stones with 1 etc., then after 4 he has to defend at 5, so White turns at 6.

Ref. Dia. 2. After 1, the continuation to 9 is a one-way street. By sacrificing the two marked stones, Black builds strength and makes the marked white stone, clinging to the black wall, look foolish.




Ref. Dia. 1: bad




Ref. Dia. 2: correct

Pattern C




The combination of the atari of 1 and the pressing move of 3 is a capturing technique. The latter move is decisive. Next —



Ref. Dia. 1: no escape *5: connects*

Ref. Dia. 1. If White 1, Black captures with 2 to 6.

Problem One




Black to play

It's obvious at a glance that the two marked black stones have been captured, so Black should try to use them as a sacrifice to build up thickness on the outside.

The key point is pressing at the right time.


Problem Two



Black to play

Black is going to have to pull off something really special to save both his surrounded groups. Some reading is required after the pressing move.


Problem Three



Black to play

The shape is similar to the previous pattern, though this time Black resorts to a large ko after the pressing move. That should be a hint.

Problem Four




Black to play


The six black stones seemingly trapped in the belly of the white beast have not really been captured. There's a standard technique after the pressing move to lead White into the hell of shortage of liberties.

Answer to Problem One

Dia. 1. The most effective way to sacrifice the two stones is to atari with 1 and 3, then press at 5. Next —



Dia. 1: correct




Dia. 2: success


Dia. 2. The continuation to White 8 is inevitable, so Black takes control of the left side with 9. Black has made maximum use of the two marked stones and has rendered the marked white stone impotent, so this result is a big success for him.

Instead of 9, Black could also play at 'a'.

Dia. 3. Black can also build outside thickness by pressing at 3. However, this is second-best. Next —



Dia. 3: second-best




Dia. 4: less effective


Dia. 4. The moves to 6 are inevitable. The marked white stone has suffered no damage, which is the difference from *Dia. 2*.

Answer to Problem Two

Dia. 1. Black has to fight with the instincts of a hunter to salvage his group. Even if you're not sure what happens next, it's obvious that pressing at 1 is the only move. Answering with White 'a' is useless because of Black 'b' and vice versa. This makes it too easy for Black, so —




Dia. 1: the only move



Dia. 2: captured 8: connects

Dia. 2. Resisting with White 2 is the only move, but Black has the strong counter of 3 and 5. In the forced continuation he captures White. If you sprang a tesuji like this on an opponent, he would grind his teeth and ask for another game.


Dia. 3. Black 3 might look like a tesuji, but things now go better for White when he resists with 4 and 6. After 7, he pulls his stones out with 8, so the black group at the bottom dies. Black is the one who will feel like resigning.



Dia. 3: wrong

Answer to Problem 3


Dia. 1. Pressing at 1 is the only move. If instead Black plays at 'a', White escapes with 'b'; if Black 'c', White escapes with 'a'.



Dia. 1: the only move *Dia. 2: a favourable ko*

Dia. 2. Attaching at 2 is the only counter for White, so Black gets a large ko with 5 and 7. It is Black's turn to capture, and in most games it's unlikely White would have a ko threat big enough. Instead of 3 —


Dia. 3. Here, too, the diagonal move of 3 is not good enough. White counters with 4 and 6, putting Black on the spot. If Black 'a', White 'b'; if instead Black 'c', White ataries at 'a', and Black is captured.



Dia. 3: wrong

Answer to Problem 4

Dia. 1. Pressing at 1 is decisive: White is helpless.




Dia. 1: correct

Dia. 2: captured

Dia. 2. If White 2, Black pushes down at 3, then simply connects at 5. Wherever White connects on the edge, he will be caught in an *oi-otoshi* (capture through successive ataries).

If Black throws in at 'a' instead of 5, he can no longer capture White — after White 'b'—Black 5, White connects at 'c'.

Dia. 3. If White 2, then throwing in at 3 is now correct. Black gets his *oi-otoshi*.




Dia. 3: captured
6: connects

Dia. 4: wrong

Dia. 4. Starting out with the throw-in is a mistake. White can now counter 3 by linking up with 4. Timing is everything.

(*Monthly Go World*, April 2005. Translated by John Power.)

Corner Problem



Dia. 1 (1-10)

Dia. 2: White to play


Black has invaded White's corner (*Dia. 1*). If Black 1 in *Dia. 2*, how does White kill him?

Answer on page 63

The Korean Style: Korean Joseki Innovations (11)


by Oya Koichi 9-dan

The patterns I have introduced so far in this series have mainly been ones incorporating strategies that would not easily find acceptance in Japanese professional go, but this month's theme is a pattern that's familiar in Japan.



Dia. 1: a common pattern


Dia. 1. There's nothing out of the ordinary about this opening. Usually White will want to play a pincer against Black 1. The popular moves recently have been 'a' and 'b', and the one-space pincer of 'c' is seen occasionally.



Dia. 2: a former joseki


Dia. 2. The second approach move of Black 2 is the most common answer to 1. The continuation to 9 is a joseki. Or perhaps it's more correct to say that it *was* a joseki.

Don't you think White 1 ends up in an awkward position? Having it located at 'a' would be ideal. You can no longer see this pattern in professional play.



Dia. 3: good for White

Dia. 3. For the above reason, players now attach at 1 here. It goes against go logic to attach against the weaker stone, but the result to 7 is good for White. The two black stones are more dead than alive. White may have had the corner taken away from him, but he has no defects in his shape.




Dia. 4: no aji left


Dia. 4. Let's assume that Black invades at 1. If White makes some kind of answer, the two black stones will save face, but that won't happen — White can safely tenuki. If Black 3, White plays 4, and Black has no appropriate way to make shape.

For that reason, this joseki also fell into disuse.

Dia. 5. Kato Masao adopted the strategy of fighting boldly with 1. Things look tough for Black when White blocks at 2, but if you study the position you find that the black group is actually quite tenacious.



Dia. 5: the Kato joseki




Dia. 6: comparison


Dia. 6. Why didn't other professionals think of Black 1 in *Dia. 5*? To explain, let's try changing the order of moves.

Let's assume that White ignores Black 1. Black of course makes a second approach move at 3. The moves to 8 are a joseki. Next, Black would like to extend down the left side, but . . . In *Dia. 5*, White has already played a pincer at 'a'. That made Black 1 in that diagram a blind spot.

Dia. 7. The sequence to 9 often appears in professional play even now. Black has fought hard both on the left side and at the top and has got what he wanted. Of course, one can't say that the result is bad for White. It's even.



Dia. 7: going all out on both sides




Dia. 8: also possible

Dia. 8. The sequence to Black 9 is also possible. Black can't extend to 'a' after White 8 [White would extend below 8, making the marked stone a hane at the head of two stones]. White is dissatisfied, as the marked white stone is slack (it should, of course, be an atari at 'a'), but I guess this is an even result.


In both *Dia. 5* and this diagram, Black doesn't want to discard his two stones.

On the other hand, how do the Koreans approach this position? They've come up with a really 'typical' strange move here.




Dia. 9: the immediate invasion

Dia. 9. The Korean answer to 1 is to invade the corner immediately with 2. If 3 and 4 follow, the damage suffered by Black is just one stone. Moreover, it still has plenty of aji.



Dia. 10: thick, but . . .


Dia. 10. Locally, White 1 next is the proper move. However, capturing by playing down towards the edge is not satisfying. Granted, it's thick.



*Dia. 11: tewari
4: elsewhere*

Dia. 11. Let's go through the by-now-familiar tewari routine. We assume that White has approached a 3-3 stone with 1, then made the natural extension to 2. Black switches elsewhere, and White plays 5 — this is a little premature, so White is dissatisfied. Next, White exchanges 'a' for Black 'b', and Black exchanges 'c' for White 'd'. That gives us *Dia. 10*.

It mustn't be forgotten that in *Dia. 10* White played on the star-point first. Yet Black occupied the 3-3 point. If you take just this difference into account, it's clear that White should be dissatisfied.




Dia. 12: a burden on White

Dia. 12. Yet if White seeks to develop a new territory with 1 here instead of 1 in *Dia. 10*, he leaves behind a 'debt' in the top left and he will be hounded by the debt collector, in the form of Black 2 to 6. Nobody is likely to connect at White 'a' after 6: it's gote and it has no effect on Black.


Dia. 13. Even though White won't connect here, capturing at the right time with Black 1 is

bigger than it looks. Black's territory swells up, on top of which, with all this thickness, Black can aim at harassing the white group on the top left side.



Dia. 13: good for Black


So White has problems. Let's look at the counter the Koreans have come up with.



Dia. 14: a forcing move

Dia. 14. Forcing with White 1 after *Dia. 9* seems to be the standard move in Korea. If White makes this exchange, he is not afraid of the sequence of 2 to 6 in *Dia. 12*. The game is probably an even contest.


Doesn't something about this bother you, though? Namely, after this exchange, White can no longer look forward to attacking at 'a'. This is the key point of the Korean variation.



Dia. 15: not sente


Dia. 15. If White does make the checking extension (the marked stone), Black just ignores it. White's follow-up aim is the placement of 1, but Black calmly answers with 2 and 4. Since Black has omitted the Black 'a'–White 'b' ex-

change, White can't capture 4. In short, White 'a' in *Dia. 14* becomes a meaningless move.



Dia. 16: common sense

Dia. 16. When Black follows the joseki in *Dia. 3*, he can't ignore White's checking extension. Resisting White 1 with Black 2 would immediately turn the game into a loss. That's just common sense.




Dia. 17: necessary

Dia. 17. Black has to defend with 1 or 'a' or 'b'.


Actually, this is not the end of the story. *Dia. 14* is more or less definitive, but the Koreans started looking for a better counter for White than 3 in *Dia. 9*. More about that in our next instalment.

(Kido, May 1999. Translated by John Power.)

Corner Problem: Answer



Dia. 1: dead




Dia. 2: dead

Dia. 1. When Black connects with the marked stone, White's counter is simple: the hane at 1. If Black blocks at 2, White can connect at 'a' or atari at 'b'.


Dia. 2. Black 1 is a little trickier — if White captures, Black blocks at 'a' and gets a ko. The answer is simply to atari on the other side at 2.

Dia. 3. Black can't increase his liberties with 1. White keeps him down to two liberties with 2 and 4, so Black is doomed.




Dia. 3: dead

Tesuji Problems




1. Black to play

Black can use his two marked stones to strike at the weak point in White's shape and take a large profit.



2. Black to play

There's something fishy about the left side of White's group. How can Black take advantage of White's bad aji?




3. Black to play and live

Answers on page 64


Tesuji Problems: Answers

Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. Black 1 (an *atekomi*) is the tesuji. The best White can do is to save his stones at the top with 2 and 4, so Black pulls out his other stone with 3 to 7.



Dia. 1: correct




Dia. 2: wrong


Dia. 2. Black 1 is hopeless: nothing happens.

Answer to Problem 2

Dia. 1. This is one of those problems that are solved by a move that doesn't look like a tesuji: Black quietly fills in a liberty on the outside. White now has no way of defending inside — if White 2, Black 3; if instead White 'a', Black 'b'.



Dia. 1: correct




Dia. 2: helping White


Dia. 2. Starting out with an atari actually helps White. If Black 1 (or another atari), White is able to live.

Answer to Problem 3

Dia. 1. Black 1 is the vital point for securing eye shape. The two white stones can't escape, but even if they could Black could make two eyes at the top.



Dia. 1: correct



Dia. 2: careless

4: throw-in (at the marked stone)

Dia. 2. Being in too much of a hurry to capture with 1 gets Black into trouble. White pushes in at 2, then, after Black 3, makes a throw-in: Black can't get two eyes.

(From a supplement to the March 2006 issue of *Monthly Go World*)

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